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AN IRRESISTIBLE ATTRACTION: 
RETHINKING ROMANTIC JEALOUSY  
AS A BASIS FOR SEX-DISCRIMINATION 
CLAIMS 
KRISTY DAHL ROGERS† 
ABSTRACT 
  Recently, the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that an employer 
who terminated an employee to allay the concerns of his jealous 
spouse did not unlawfully discriminate on the basis of sex. Though 
the Iowa decision addressed a claim filed under a state civil rights 
statute, it highlights an emerging question in broader sex-
discrimination jurisprudence—whether terminating an employee 
based on romantic jealousy constitutes unlawful sex discrimination. 
  This Note argues that Title VII should be interpreted to prohibit 
some terminations based on romantic jealousy. Sex-discrimination 
claims based on romantic jealousy are properly classified as mixed-
motive claims. Thus, the question courts must ask in analyzing 
romantic-jealousy claims is whether the jealousy that provoked a 
termination was motivated by gender. In some circumstances, it will 
be clear that gender motivated both romantic jealousy and any 
termination resulting therefrom. 
  Courts should not rely on or extend precedents involving 
favoritism or romantic relationships to dismiss sex-discrimination 
claims arising due to romantic jealousy. The rationales justifying the 
dismissal of claims in the favoritism and romantic-relationship 
contexts are inapplicable to the romantic-jealousy context. 
Furthermore, to dismiss claims due to the existence of nonsexual, 
nonromantic personal relationships between employers and 
employees would drastically limit Title VII’s reach. To accurately 
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determine whether jealousy-based termination constitutes unlawful 
discrimination, courts must look behind the jealousy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Melissa Nelson was just twenty years old when she graduated 
from the dental-assistant program at Des Moines Area Community 
College.1 A few months later, she accepted a position in the office of 
her dentist, Dr. James Knight, in Fort Dodge, Iowa, just minutes from 
the rural community where she attended high school.2 Melissa 
continued to work for Dr. Knight for the next ten years, and she came 
to regard him as both a father figure and a friend.3 When he abruptly 
terminated her employment, she was shocked.4 
Dr. Knight forthrightly described his reasons for firing Melissa. 
In fact, he terminated her in the presence of his pastor by reading to 
her from a prepared statement that said his relationship with her had 
become a detriment to his family.5 Dr. Knight wrote the statement 
after his wife, who also worked at the office, demanded he fire 
Melissa because she had come to view her as a threat to their 
marriage.6 
That evening, Dr. Knight invited Melissa’s husband to his office.7 
He repeatedly assured Mr. Nelson that Melissa had not acted 
inappropriately and that nothing was going on between them.8 But 
Dr. Knight admitted that he thought about Melissa constantly and 
feared he would try to have an affair with her if he did not fire her.9 
He acknowledged that he fired Melissa because he was concerned 
that he had become too personally attached to her, and he admitted 
that she was the best dental assistant he had ever had.10 
 
 1. Joint Appendix at 62, 98, Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 
2013). 
 2. Id. at 32, 62, 98, 101, 131. 
 3. Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 65 (Iowa 2013). 
 4. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 63. 
 5. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 66. A copy of Dr. Knight’s handwritten statement appears in the 
Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 38. 
 6. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 66. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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Melissa Nelson brought a sex-discrimination suit against Dr. 
Knight in state district court11 under the Iowa Civil Rights Act,12 a 
state civil rights statute modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act.13 Dr. Knight moved for summary judgment,14 arguing that Nelson 
had cited no direct evidence of sex discrimination and asserting that 
he had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her—
his wife demanded that he fire her to preserve their marriage.15 The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Knight, 
reasoning that “Nelson was fired not because of her gender but 
because she was a threat to the marriage of Dr. Knight.”16 On appeal, 
the Iowa Supreme Court, in a controversial opinion,17 unanimously 
affirmed summary judgment in favor of Dr. Knight.18 The opinion 
framed the issue before the court as “whether an employee who has 
not engaged in flirtatious conduct may be lawfully terminated simply 
because the boss views the employee as an irresistible attraction.”19 
Because of this language, the media interpreted the opinion to 
declare that an employee may be legally fired when her boss finds her 
to be too attractive.20 
 
 11. Id. at 65, 67. 
 12. IOWA CODE § 216.6 (2013). 
 13. Deboom v. Raining Rose, Inc., 772 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Iowa 2009). Title VII is codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012). 
 14. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67. 
 15. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 14–21. 
 16. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67 (quotation marks omitted). 
 17. See, e.g., Ryan J. Foley, Iowa Court: Bosses Can Fire ‘Irresistible’ Workers, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 21, 2012, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/iowa-court-bosses-
can-fire-irresistible-workers; Iowa: Court Upholds Firing of Woman Whose Boss Found Her 
Attractive, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2012, at A17; CNN Newsroom (CNN television broadcast Dec. 
21, 2012), available at http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/21/justice/iowa-irresistible-worker; Good 
Morning America (ABC television broadcast Dec. 23, 2012), available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/video/dental-assistant-fired-attractive-18049209. 
 18. Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., No. 11–1857, 2012 WL 6652747, at *5 (Iowa 
Dec. 21, 2012), withdrawn and superseded on reh’g, 834 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 2013). Iowa has a 
“deflective appellate structure” whereby district-court decisions are appealed directly to the 
Iowa Supreme Court. State v. Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880, 883–84 (Iowa 2009); see IOWA CODE 
§§ 602.4102, 602.5103 (2014) (defining the jurisdiction of the Iowa Supreme Court and the Iowa 
Court of Appeals). 
 19. Nelson, 2012 WL 6652747, at *5. 
 20. See, e.g., Doug Barry, Iowa Supreme Court Says It Was Totally Cool for a Dentist To 
Fire His ‘Irresistibly Attractive’ Female Employee, JEZEBEL, Dec. 22, 2012 (“In other words, a 
female employee in Iowa was fired because her boss found himself leering at her too often, and 
this incapacity to behave like a decent, professional human somehow, in the hothouse 
imagination of the Iowa Supreme Court, became her problem.”); Rekha Basu, Iowa Supreme 
Court Ruling in ‘Too Irresistible’ Case is an Embarrassment, DES MOINES REGISTER, Dec. 29, 
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Six months later the Iowa Supreme Court took the unusual step 
of withdrawing its original opinion and granting a rehearing without 
oral argument.21 The superseding opinion unanimously reaffirmed 
summary judgment in favor of Dr. Knight.22 The court’s analysis 
remained largely unchanged,23 but it reframed the issue presented as 
“whether an employee who has not engaged in flirtatious conduct 
may be lawfully terminated simply because the boss’s spouse views 
the relationship between the boss and the employee as a threat to her 
marriage.”24 The superseding opinion also included a special 
concurrence acknowledging that Nelson had stated a sex-
discrimination claim but ultimately concluding that she was fired 
“because of the activities of her consensual personal relationship with 
her employer” and not because she was a woman.25 Once again the 
decision received national media attention.26 
In deciding Nelson, the Iowa Supreme Court relied upon the 
same analytical framework courts apply when interpreting Title VII.27 
 
2012 (“The ruling so disregards core civil rights principles that it is hard to believe this same 
court made civil-rights history three years ago by ruling that gay people had a right to marry in 
Iowa.”).  
 21. Order, Nelson, 2012 WL 6652747 (No. 11–1857); see Jeff Eckhoff, Iowa Supreme Court 
Takes Another Look at ‘Irresistible Employee’ Case, DES MOINES REGISTER BLOG (June 26, 
2013, 1:45 PM), http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/index.php/2013/06/26/iowa-supreme-
court-pulls-back-decision-on-irresistible-employee-lawsuit-for-another-look/article (noting that 
a court spokesperson “called such situations ‘rare’ and said justices have granted a total of five 
petitions to rehear a case over the past decade”); see also Ryan Koopmans, Iowa Supreme Court 
To Reconsider Case of “Irresistible Employee”, ON BRIEF: IOWA’S APPELLATE BLOG (June 25, 
2013), http://www.iowaappeals.com/iowa-supreme-court-to-reconsider-case-of-irresistible-
employee (suggesting that the national response played a part in Nelson’s decision to file a 
petition for rehearing). 
 22. Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 73 (Iowa 2013). 
 23. The only significant change to the majority opinion beyond the sentence in which the 
holding appeared was the addition of a paragraph contrasting the circumstances presented in 
Nelson with those presented in an Eighth Circuit case reversing summary judgment in favor of 
an employer based on the plaintiff’s allegation that she was fired because of her appearance. 
Compare Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 71–72 (discussing Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 
F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010)), with Nelson, 2012 WL 6652747, at *7 (omitting any discussion of 
appearance-based sex-discrimination precedents). 
 24. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 69. Note that this framing of the issue shifts the focus to the 
actions of Mrs. Knight. 
 25. Id. at 78 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially). 
 26. See, e.g., Michael Kimmel, Fired for Being Beautiful, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2013, at A25; 
20/20: The Naked Truth (ABC television broadcast Aug. 2, 2013). 
 27. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Deboom v. Raining Rose, Inc., 772 
N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2009); Channon v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 861 (Iowa 
2001)). Recently, however, the Iowa Supreme Court clarified that federal antidiscrimination 
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The court interpreted Title VII case law to provide “that an employer 
does not engage in unlawful gender discrimination by discharging a 
female employee who is involved in a consensual relationship that has 
triggered personal jealousy,” regardless of whether the jealousy 
would have existed had the employee been male.28 Virtually all states 
have statutes banning sex discrimination in employment,29 and these 
statutes are often interpreted in accordance with existing judicial 
interpretations of Title VII or other state antidiscrimination statutes.30 
Judges and advocates will likely cite Nelson for the proposition that it 
does not constitute sex discrimination for an employer to terminate 
an employee based on jealousy experienced by the employer’s 
partner or spouse. Thus, although Nelson addressed a state civil rights 
claim, the case has broad implications with respect to an emerging 
question31 in sex-discrimination jurisprudence—whether terminating 
an employee based on romantic jealousy constitutes unlawful sex 
discrimination.  
This Note illustrates that Title VII should not be interpreted to 
support a general rule that terminations based on romantic jealousy 
are lawful. Part I briefly surveys the historical treatment of mixed-
motive discrimination claims in the context of Title VII. Part II 
describes how courts have dismissed sex-discrimination claims arising 
in the romantic-jealousy context based on precedents concerning 
favoritism and romantic relationships. Setting aside the question of 
whether courts should rely on favoritism and romantic-relationship 
precedents in deciding romantic-jealousy claims, Part III defines 
jealousy and then relies on this definition to construct an affirmative 
argument that terminations resulting from romantic jealousy may 
constitute unlawful sex discrimination. Returning to the question set 
aside in Part III, Part IV critiques both the application of favoritism 
and romantic-relationship precedents to romantic-jealousy claims and 
 
precedents are merely persuasive in interpreting the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Pippen v. State, 854 
N.W.2d 1, 28 (Iowa 2014). 
 28. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67; see id. at 67–72 (surveying and describing Title VII case law). 
 29. Mitchell Poole, Paramours, Promotions, and Sexual Favoritism: Unfair, But Is There 
Liability?, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 819, 828 (1998). 
 30. See, e.g., Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67–72 (relying on federal appellate courts’ 
interpretations of Title VII and a Michigan appellate court’s interpretation of the Michigan 
Civil Rights Act in interpreting the Iowa Civil Rights Act). 
 31. For example, a sex-discrimination claim involving romantic jealousy is currently 
pending in New York. See Complaint, Dilek v. Nicolai, No. 160830/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 20, 
2013). 
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Nelson’s extension of the romantic-relationship rule to personal 
relationships. 
I.  A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF MIXED-MOTIVE ANALYSIS OF 
TITLE VII CLAIMS 
Sex-discrimination claims based on romantic jealousy are 
properly classified as mixed-motive claims because they do not allege 
that sex was the only reason for an employment decision.32 This Part 
briefly describes how Title VII came to prohibit discrimination based 
in part on sex and sketches the basic contours of the analytical 
framework applicable to such claims. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196433 made it unlawful for an 
employer to discharge an employee “because of” his or her sex or 
other protected characteristic.34 Over time, a circuit split emerged 
concerning the proper interpretation of the phrase “because of.” 
Some circuits stringently applied “but-for” analysis to Title VII 
claims, recognizing discrimination only when the plaintiff showed that 
an adverse employment decision would not have been made but for a 
protected characteristic.35 For a female plaintiff to prevail on a sex-
discrimination claim in these circuits, she had to establish that an 
adverse employment decision would not have been made if she had 
been a man.36 By contrast, other circuits applied various forms of 
mixed-motive analysis to Title VII claims, recognizing discrimination 
when a plaintiff showed that a protected characteristic was a 
“substantial,” “motivating,” or “discernible” factor in an adverse 
employment decision.37 In 1989, the Supreme Court legitimized 
 
 32. See infra Part III.A. 
 33. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703, 78 Stat. 255 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012)). 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 35. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 238 n.2 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(describing the approach taken in the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits whereby the 
plaintiff was required to show that but for the protected characteristic, the adverse employment 
decision would not have been made), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 
(2013). 
 36. Id.  
 37. See id. (describing the approaches taken in the First, Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, 
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits in which liability attached when a protected characteristic was a 
“substantial,” “motivating,” or “discernible” factor in an adverse employment decision so long 
as the employer did not prove that the same decision would have been made in the absence of 
discrimination). 
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mixed-motive analysis in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,38 a case in 
which a plurality and two concurring Justices concluded that Title VII 
allows employers to be held liable for employment decisions 
motivated only in part by an unlawful motive.39 This landmark 
decision resolved the Title VII debate among the circuits and clarified 
that Title VII prohibits employment decisions resulting from “both 
legitimate and illegitimate considerations.”40 Under Price Waterhouse, 
an employer could avoid liability for an employment decision 
motivated in part by an employee’s protected characteristic only by 
demonstrating that the same decision would have been made even if 
the protected characteristic had not been considered.41 
Price Waterhouse retained two important limits on courts’ 
recognition of mixed-motive claims. First, recognition of mixed-
motive claims was limited to cases in which a plaintiff demonstrated 
that an illegitimate motive was a “substantial factor in the particular 
employment decision.”42 Second, recognition of mixed-motive claims 
was limited based on whether the plaintiff presented direct or 
circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Mixed-motive claims that 
relied on “direct evidence” to show that a protected characteristic was 
a “substantial factor” in a contested employment decision were 
 
 38. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded by 
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Univ. of 
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
 39. Id. at 239–45 (plurality opinion); id. at 259–60 (White, J., concurring); id. at 265 
(O’Connor, J., concurring); see Thomas F. Kondro, Comment, Mixed Motives and Motivating 
Factors: Choosing a Realistic Summary Judgment Framework for § 2000e-2(m) of Title VII, 54 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1439, 1442 & n.19 (2010) (observing that Price Waterhouse “legitimized the 
mixed-motive analysis, which previously had been rejected by some circuits in favor of a more 
stringent ‘but-for’ standard of causation”). Legislative history played a prominent role in the 
outcome. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239 & n.4, 241 & n.7, 243–44 & nn.8–9 (plurality 
opinion); id. at 262 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Most notably, Congress rejected an amendment 
that would have limited Title VII to prohibit only employment actions taken “solely because of” 
a protected characteristic. 110 CONG. REC. 2728 (1964). 
 40. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 (plurality opinion); id. at 239–45; id. at 259–60 
(White, J., concurring); id. at 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 41. Id. at 252 (plurality opinion). Following Price Waterhouse, most courts interpreted 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence as controlling. Kristina N. Klein, Oasis or Mirage? Desert 
Palace and Its Impact on the Summary Judgment Landscape, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1177, 1184 
& n.58 (2006); David Sherwyn & Michael Heise, The Gross Beast of Burden of Proof: 
Experimental Evidence on How the Burden of Proof Influences Employment Discrimination 
Case Outcomes, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 901, 911 (2010); Kondro, supra note 39, at 1443. But see Gross 
v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 188 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Justice 
White’s concurring opinion was “properly understood as controlling”). 
 42. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 278 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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evaluated using the framework articulated in Price Waterhouse.43 By 
contrast, mixed-motive claims that relied on “circumstantial 
evidence” to show that an employment decision was motivated by a 
protected characteristic continued to be analyzed under the pretext 
framework applied to single-motive claims.44 To prevail under that 
framework, an employee had to show either that the employer made 
the employment decision for a discriminatory reason or that any 
nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the employer was pretextual.45 
In practice, this meant that plaintiffs bringing mixed-motive claims 
that relied on circumstantial evidence rarely prevailed because they 
were unable to prove that employers’ articulated reasons for 
employment decisions were pretextual.46 In other words, even after 
Price Waterhouse, many mixed-motive claims failed because plaintiffs 
were rarely able to present “direct evidence”47 that discriminatory 
animus was a “substantial factor” in an employment decision.48 
Recognizing that Price Waterhouse would have the “inevitable 
effect” of permitting prohibited employment discrimination to escape 
 
 43. Id. at 276–79. 
 44. Id. at 278–79. But see Kondro, supra note 39, at 1443 & n.26 (suggesting that in practice 
the lower courts “categorically rejected” mixed-motive claims relying on circumstantial 
evidence without applying the pretext framework). 
 45. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (citing McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804–05 (1973)). 
 46. See Michael A. Zubrensky, Despite the Smoke, There Is No Gun: Direct Evidence 
Requirements in Mixed-Motives Employment Law After Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 STAN. 
L. REV. 959, 976 (1994) (describing how plaintiffs with only circumstantial evidence to support a 
mixed-motive claim “generally were unable to prove pretext because the defendant could 
articulate a ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory’ reason”). By design, the pretext framework was 
intended to identify discrimination resulting from a single illegitimate motive. See Kondro, 
supra note 39, at 1448. 
 47. “Direct evidence” was not explicitly defined in Price Waterhouse, but the definition 
applied by Justice O’Connor strayed from the traditional definition. Paul J. Gudel, Beyond 
Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives Problem in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 68 (1991); Steven M. Tindall, Do as She Does, Not as 
She Says: The Shortcomings of Justice O’Connor’s Direct Evidence Requirement in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 332, 336, 343–44 (1996); Zubrensky, 
supra note 46, at 969. This resulted in disparity among the lower courts in interpreting the 
direct-evidence requirement. Id. at 970. 
 48. See Gabrielle R. Lamarche, State of Employment Discrimination Cases After Hicks, 32 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 107, 111 & n.34 (1998) (observing that “direct evidence of discriminatory 
intent by an employer rarely exists”); T.L. Nagy, The Fall of the False Dichotomy: The Effect of 
Desert Palace v. Costa on Summary Judgment in Title VII Discrimination Cases, 46 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 137, 141 (2004) (noting that mixed-motive plaintiffs “rarely presented direct evidence of a 
discriminatory motive”). 
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judicial sanction,49 Congress responded by passing the Civil Rights 
Act of 199150 to amend Title VII.51 As amended, Title VII provides 
that “an unlawful employment practice” is established once a plaintiff 
demonstrates that a protected characteristic “was a motivating factor 
for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice.”52 Because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
abrogated Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court subsequently held in 
Desert Palace v. Costa53 that plaintiffs need not present direct or 
substantial evidence to obtain a motivating-factor jury instruction, 
effectively eliminating the Price Waterhouse limits on mixed-motive 
analysis.54 
 
 49. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 46 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 584 (“The 
inevitable effect of the Price Waterhouse decision is to permit prohibited employment 
discrimination to escape sanction under Title VII.”); see H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 18 
(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 711 (“Price Waterhouse severely undermines 
protections against intentional employment discrimination by allowing such discrimination to 
escape sanction completely under Title VII.”). 
 50. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.  
 51. See, e.g., Kondro, supra note 39, at 1444 (“Displeased by Price Waterhouse, Congress 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to supersede the Supreme Court’s decision.”). 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012). 
 53. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 54. Id. at 101–02; see id. at 98–100 (explaining that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 abrogated 
Price Waterhouse). Importantly, Desert Palace addressed appropriate jury instructions for 
mixed-motive claims rather than the appropriate framework for summary-judgment analysis. 
Many federal courts of appeals responded by fully or partially eliminating the direct-evidence 
requirement at the summary-judgment stage as well, but there remains a circuit split on the 
appropriate summary-judgment framework for mixed-motive claims. Only the Eighth Circuit 
has explicitly held that Desert Palace had “no impact” on summary-judgment analysis for 
mixed-motive claims. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004). Four 
circuits permit plaintiffs pursuing mixed-motive claims to choose which framework is applied. 
Perez v. N.J. Transit Corp., 341 F. App’x 757, 761 (3d Cir. 2009); Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 447, 
451 & n.* (D.C. Cir. 2007); Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 
(4th Cir. 2005); McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004). The Sixth 
Circuit no longer applies the pretext framework in summary-judgment analysis of mixed-motive 
claims. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 400–01 (6th Cir. 2008). And the Fifth 
Circuit allows plaintiffs with mixed-motive claims to avoid summary judgment by creating a 
genuine issue with respect to whether the articulated reason for an employment decision was 
pretextual or whether a protected characteristic was a motivating factor. Rachid v. Jack In The 
Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004). Three circuits have declined to decide this question. 
See EEOC v. TBC Corp., No. 12–14341, 2013 WL 5433661, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 1, 2013) (noting 
that the court “need not decide” the appropriate summary-judgment framework for mixed-
motive claims following Desert Palace); Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 304 F. App’x 707, 718 & 
n.11 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that the court “need not resolve” whether Desert Palace required 
any modifications to the pretext framework ordinarily applied at the summary-judgment stage); 
Hillstrom v. Best W. TLC Hotel, 354 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2003) (expressing doubt as to whether 
the question of the appropriate summary-judgment framework had been preserved but noting 
that even if the issue had been preserved “it would make no difference” to the outcome in the 
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Thus, Title VII currently provides that prohibited discrimination 
occurs whenever sex is a motivating factor in an employment 
decision, even if the same decision would have been made regardless 
of the employee’s sex.55 When an employer proves that he would have 
made the same decision absent the impermissible motivating factor, 
however, the employee is not eligible to receive compensatory 
damages.56 
II.  JUDICIAL RELIANCE ON FAVORITISM AND ROMANTIC-
RELATIONSHIP PRECEDENTS IN  
ANALYSIS OF ROMANTIC-JEALOUSY CLAIMS 
Few courts have considered sex-discrimination claims based on 
terminations resulting from romantic jealousy.57 In the rare instances 
in which courts have considered such claims, they have generally 
refused to characterize the underlying employment decisions as sex 
discrimination.58 This Part illustrates how precedents involving 
 
case before the court). Nelson was an appeal from a decision granting summary judgment to the 
employer, but the suit was brought under the Iowa Civil Rights Act, not Title VII. Thus, the 
Iowa Supreme Court considered whether gender was a motivating factor in Nelson’s 
termination without explicitly addressing the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that Desert Palace 
should not affect summary-judgment analysis of mixed-motive claims. Nelson v. James H. 
Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Iowa 2013). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012). 
 56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (limiting damages in discrimination actions brought under 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) to declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees when the 
employer demonstrates that the same action would have been taken “in the absence of the 
impermissible motivating factor”). 
 57. This Note addresses sex-discrimination claims based on romantic jealousy, 
distinguishing these from claims based on envy. See infra notes 141–51 and accompanying text 
(describing the distinction between jealousy and envy and defining romantic jealousy). 
Although courts do not tend to explicitly distinguish between claims involving jealousy and 
envy, they consistently deny claims involving an employer who is envious of an employee’s 
relationship with another person. See, e.g., Blackshear v. Interstate Brands Corp., 495 F. App’x 
613, 615, 617 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming summary judgment in favor of an employer described as 
“jealous” when the employee showed that her supervisor was envious of her relationship with 
another employee); Bush v. Raymond Corp., 954 F. Supp. 490, 491–92, 498 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(concluding that an employee’s allegation that she was terminated because her supervisor was 
“jealous” of her relationship with another employee did not establish a prima facie case of sex 
discrimination); Barrett v. Kirtland Cmty. Coll., 628 N.W.2d 63, 67, 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) 
(holding that “conduct based on romantic jealousy” did not constitute sex discrimination when 
an employee showed that his supervisor was envious of his relationship with another employee). 
 58. See Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 911 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant); Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 
F.2d 902, 906 (11th Cir. 1990) (affirming judgment for the defendants); Nelson v. James H. 
Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 73 (Iowa 2013) (affirming summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants); cf. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 81 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially) (“Research has 
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favoritism and romantic relationships have played a role in this 
refusal by describing two leading cases involving romantic jealousy, 
Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc.59 and Tenge v. Phillips 
Modern Ag Co.60 It then examines the Iowa Supreme Court’s reliance 
on Platner and Tenge in concluding that Melissa Nelson’s termination 
was lawful. 
A. Judicial Reliance on Favoritism Precedents 
Courts generally decline to recognize sex-discrimination claims 
when preferential treatment of one employee due to nepotism or 
favoritism resulted in another employee suffering an adverse 
employment action.61 Courts apply this general rule even in cases in 
which an adverse employment action resulted from sexual 
favoritism,62 a form of favoritism that typically involves an employer 
 
failed to uncover any appellate court in the nation that has recognized sex discrimination under 
facts similar to those in this case.”). But see Lococo v. Barger, 234 F.3d 1268 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(unpublished table decision) (reversing a district court’s grant of summary judgment to a 
plaintiff who alleged that she was terminated based on the jealousy of her supervisor’s wife).  
 59. Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 60. Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 61. See, e.g., Schobert v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Whether 
the employer grants employment perks to an employee because she is a protegé, an old friend, a 
close relative or a love interest, that special treatment is permissible as long as it is not based on 
an impermissible classification.”). But see Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 445 F. Supp. 421, 
436 (W.D. Wash. 1977) (“Although Title VII does not prohibit nepotism as such, it prohibits 
nepotism when it results in discrimination.” (citing Gibson v. Local 40, Supercargoes & 
Checkers, 543 F.2d 1259, 1268 (9th Cir. 1976))), aff’d, 727 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984), modified, 
742 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 62. The position of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is that 
“isolated instances of preferential treatment based upon consensual romantic relationships” are 
not prohibited by Title VII, whereas favoritism based on coerced conduct may constitute quid 
pro quo harassment and widespread favoritism may constitute hostile-environment harassment. 
U.S. EEOC, NOTICE NO. 915.048, POLICY GUIDANCE ON EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER TITLE 
VII FOR SEXUAL FAVORITISM (1990), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/ 
sexualfavor.html. These guidelines are not mandatory. Stephen Dacus, Miller v. Department of 
Corrections: The Application of Title VII to Consensual, Indirect Employer Conduct, 59 OKLA. 
L. REV. 833, 842 (2006) (“EEOC regulations are not controlling authority.” (citing Meritor Sav. 
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976); 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975))). Nonetheless, most circuits have 
declined to recognize sex discrimination in the context of sexual favoritism. Duncan v. Cnty. of 
Dakota, 687 F.3d 955, 959 (8th Cir. 2012); Wilson v. Delta State Univ., 143 F. App’x 611, 614 
(5th Cir. 2005) (citing Ackel v. Nat’l Commc’ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 382 (5th Cir. 2003)); 
Schobert, 304 F.3d at 733 (citing DeCintio v. Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 306 (2d 
Cir. 1986)); Womack v. Runyon, 147 F.3d 1298, 1300–01 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Taken v. 
Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1370 (10th Cir. 1997); Becerra v. Dalton, 94 F.3d 145, 149–
50 (4th Cir. 1996); DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 308; Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495, 
501 (W.D. Pa. 1988), aff’d, 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988). In addition, some states have declined to 
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favoring an employee with whom he or she63 has a sexual or romantic 
relationship.64 One rationale for refusing to recognize favoritism 
claims is that when an employer favors one employee, every other 
employee is equally disadvantaged regardless of his or her sex.65 
Consequently, favoritism does not necessarily suggest the existence of 
an invidious motive toward either sex.66 Another rationale is that Title 
VII prohibits differentiation based on “sex” but not differentiation 
based on sexual, familial, or other relationships.67 
In the typical romantic-jealousy case, an employer becomes 
aware that his or her spouse is jealous of a particular employee and 
consequently terminates that employee. This bears some resemblance 
to the typical sexual-favoritism case described above in that the 
employer terminates the employee while considering the interests of 
a person with whom he or she has a preexisting romantic 
relationship—typically the employer’s spouse or romantic partner. It 
is therefore unsurprising that courts have acknowledged that Title 
 
recognize sexual-favoritism claims. Poole, supra note 29, at 845 (citing Herman v. W. Fin. Corp., 
869 P.2d 696, 701–03 (Kan. 1994); Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 569 A.2d 793, 801–03 
(N.J. 1990)).  
 63. Some examples and hypothetical scenarios in this Note utilize gendered pronouns. For 
clarity and consistency, the gender of employer and employee in these examples remains 
consistent with the gender of the employer and employee in Nelson. 
 64. Dacus, supra note 62, at 833; Poole, supra note 29, at 819 n.2. 
 65. See, e.g., Green v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 656 n.6 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(“[F]avoritism, while unfair, disadvantages both sexes alike for reasons other than gender.”) 
 66. See, e.g., Preston v. Wis. Health Fund, 397 F.3d 539, 541 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Neither in 
purpose nor in consequence can favoritism resulting from a personal relationship be equated to 
sex discrimination.”). 
 67. See, e.g., Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 826 (4th Cir. 1989) (“The list of 
impermissible considerations . . . is both limited and specific: ‘race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin.’ We are not free to add our own considerations to the list.”); see also Taken, 125 
F.3d at 1369–70 (“Title VII’s reference to ‘sex’ means a class delineated by gender, rather than 
sexual affiliations.”); DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306–07 (“The proscribed differentiation under Title 
VII . . . must be a distinction based on a person’s sex, not on his or her sexual affiliations.” 
(citing L.A. Dep’t. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978); Meritor, 477 
U.S. at 64)). Nonetheless, there is typically at least some causal connection between gender and 
employment actions based on sexual favoritism because the favored employee’s gender 
corresponds to the supervisor’s sexual preference for a particular gender. See Poole, supra note 
29, at 832 (“Given that sexual favoritism is based first upon a supervisor’s attraction to a 
particular gender, a causal connection exists between the supervisor’s subsequent actions, 
gender, and who gets harmed.”). 
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VII does not prohibit employment decisions based on favoritism in 
deciding romantic-jealousy claims.68 
But courts have dismissed romantic-jealousy claims based on 
their similarity to favoritism claims rather than simply acknowledging 
these similarities. For example, in Platner v. Cash & Thomas 
Contractors, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the rule that Title VII 
does not prohibit favoritism to dismiss a romantic-jealousy claim.69 In 
Platner, the employer’s spouse was not jealous of the terminated 
employee.70 Rather, his daughter-in-law suspected that the employee 
and her husband (the employer’s son) were having an affair.71 The 
employer terminated the employee because his daughter-in-law had 
become “extremely jealous.”72 The record did not reflect whether the 
alleged affair had actually occurred.73 
The court recognized that there was no basis for concluding that 
the termination was based on the employee’s performance or 
workplace conduct.74 The employee had socialized with her 
coworkers, but the court concluded that although “not entirely 
prudent,” such actions were “basically blameless.”75 The court 
emphasized, however, that the trial judge had criticized the conduct 
of the employer’s son and daughter-in-law by finding that he fueled 
his wife’s jealousy and responded abusively to her accusations and 
that she possessed “a heightened sense of need to protect her marital 
interest.”76 
The Eleventh Circuit described the question presented as 
whether, under such circumstances, “personal, family-related 
reasons . . . constitute a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis” for 
terminating an employee under Title VII.77 The court characterized 
 
 68. See, e.g., Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 908–09 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(describing the rule derived from sexual-favoritism precedents in considering a sex-
discrimination claim arising in the context of jealousy).  
 69. Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 70. Id. at 903–04. 
 71. Id. at 903. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 903–04. 
 74. Id. But see Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 909 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing 
Platner in a discussion about terminations involving consensual sexual conduct); Nelson v. 
James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 76 (Iowa 2013) (Cady, C.J., concurring specially) 
(suggesting that the employee in Platner was fired due to sexually suggestive conduct). 
 75. Platner, 908 F.2d at 903 (quotation marks omitted). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 904. 
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the employer as having faced “a choice as to which employee to 
keep” and suggested that, in making that choice, the employer had 
reasonably “opted to place the burden of resolving the situation” on 
an unrelated employee rather than his son.78 Consequently, the court 
concluded that the “ultimate basis” for the employer’s decision “was 
not gender but simply favoritism for a close relative.”79 Having 
determined that the termination was due to “personal, family-related 
reasons,” the court held that termination was not actionable because 
Title VII does not prohibit favoritism toward relatives.80 
B. Judicial Reliance on Romantic-Relationship Precedents 
Courts consistently refuse to recognize sex-discrimination claims 
when an employee has participated in a consensual sexual or 
romantic relationship with an employer.81 The primary rationale for 
this rule is that Title VII prohibits employment decisions “based on a 
person’s sex, but not based on his or her sexual affiliations.”82 A 
second rationale is that Title VII does not prohibit employment 
decisions based on feelings unmotivated by any protected 
characteristic.83 This rationale is distinguishable from the primary 
 
 78. Id. at 905. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 904, 905–06 (citing Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 825–26 (4th Cir. 
1989)). 
 81. See, e.g., Benders v. Bellows & Bellows, 515 F.3d 757, 768 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Essentially, 
Benders complains of being discriminated against not because of her sex, but because of her 
consensual sexual relationship with Mr. Bellows. We agree that these allegations are insufficient 
to support a cause of action for sex discrimination.” (citing Kahn v. Objective Solutions, Int’l, 86 
F. Supp. 2d 377, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Huebschen v. Dep’t of Health and Soc. Servs., 716 F.2d 
1167, 1172 (7th Cir. 1983))); see also Taken v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1370 (10th 
Cir. 1997) (declining to recognize sex-discrimination claims based on “consensual romantic 
involvements”); DeCintio v. Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(holding that “voluntary, romantic relationships cannot form the basis of a sex discrimination 
suit”); Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 75 (Iowa 2013) (Cady, C.J., 
concurring specially) (“What has emerged from this complex area of the law is the general legal 
principle that an adverse employment consequence experienced by an employee because of a 
voluntary, romantic relationship does not form the basis of a sex-discrimination suit.” (citing 
Kahn, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 382)). 
 82. DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306–07 (“The proscribed differentiation under Title VII . . . must 
be a distinction based on a person’s sex, not on his or her sexual affiliations.”). 
 83. See, e.g., Barnett v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 153 F.3d 338, 343 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(“[P]ersonal conflict does not equate with discriminatory animus.”); McCollum v. Bolger, 794 
F.2d 602, 610 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Personal animosity is not the equivalent of sex discrimination 
and is not proscribed by Title VII.”); Keppler v. Hinsdale Twp. High Sch. Dist. 86, 715 F. Supp. 
862, 869 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (applying a rebuttable presumption that termination following a failed 
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rationale for the rule in that it presumes that employment decisions 
made in the context of sexual or romantic relationships are motivated 
by the employer’s feelings toward the employee rather than the 
employee’s actions or sexual orientation. Finally, a third rationale is 
that the employee who is romantically involved with an employer 
elects to extend the workplace relationship into the private realm, 
where the prohibitions of Title VII no longer apply.84 Courts do not 
hesitate to apply the romantic-relationship rule to dismiss sex-
discrimination claims, including those based on jealousy arising in the 
context of sexual relationships.85 
The rule that Title VII does not prohibit terminations in the 
context of romantic relationships was extended to deny a claim based 
on jealousy arising in the context of sexually suggestive employee 
conduct in the Eighth Circuit case Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co.86 
The employer and employee in Tenge were not engaged in a sexual 
relationship, but the employee acknowledged that she had engaged in 
sexually suggestive conduct.87 For example, she and her employer had 
pinched each other’s buttocks in the employer’s wife’s presence, and 
she had left sexually suggestive notes for her employer in places 
where others could see them.88 The employee acknowledged that this 
suggestive behavior could have caused her employer’s wife to believe 
that she had an intimate relationship with her employer, and the wife 
did in fact suspect that such a relationship existed and was concerned 
that the employee may have been attempting to seduce her husband.89 
The employer eventually terminated the employee, explaining to her 
 
relationship is “the result not of sexual discrimination, but of responses to an individual because 
of her former intimate place in her employer’s life”). 
 84. See Keppler, 715 F. Supp. at 869 (“An employee who chooses to become involved in an 
intimate affair with her employer . . . removes an element of her employment relationship from 
the workplace, and in the realm of private affairs people do have the right to react to rejection, 
jealousy and other emotions which Title VII says have no place in the employment setting.”); 
Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 76 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially) (pointing out “the practical change 
in an employment relationship that occurs when a relationship extends beyond the workplace”). 
 85. See, e.g., Kahn, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 378–79, 382 (dismissing the claim of an employee who 
was terminated at the insistence of her employer’s wife because the employee had a consensual 
sexual relationship with the employer); Campbell v. Masten, 955 F. Supp. 526, 528, 529 (D. Md. 
1997) (dismissing the claim of an employee who alleged that she was perceived to be a threat to 
her employer’s marriage based on her prior sexual relationship with her employer). 
 86. Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 87. Id. at 906. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
ROGERS IN PP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015  11:44 AM 
1468 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1453 
that his wife had made him choose between his “best employee or her 
and the kids.”90 
The employee filed suit on the theory that “arousing the jealousy 
of the boss’s wife is an illegal criterion for discharge under Title 
VII.”91 The Eighth Circuit noted that the court was not presented with 
a situation in which an employee had not engaged in sexually 
suggestive behavior and was “terminated simply because an employer 
or supervisor’s spouse perceive[d] the employee to be a threat.”92 On 
the contrary, the question presented was whether “termination on the 
basis of an employee’s admitted, consensual sexual conduct with a 
supervisor” violates Title VII.93 The court was careful to point out 
that the touching and the notes distinguished the employee’s actions 
from the “general sexual banter” that took place among other 
employees.94 
The Eighth Circuit closely examined the relationship between 
sexual conduct and sexual favoritism, noting that sexual favoritism 
occurs when one employee receives favorable treatment relative to 
other employees based on a “consensual relationship” with the 
employer.95 The court concluded that the relevant principle to be 
taken from sexual-favoritism precedents is that when “an employee 
engages in consensual sexual conduct with a supervisor and an 
employment decision is based on this conduct, Title VII is not 
implicated because any benefits of the relationship are due to the 
sexual conduct, rather than the gender, of the employee.”96 Turning to 
precedents in which employees were treated less favorably than 
others based on consensual sexual conduct, the Eighth Circuit 
described several courts as having concluded that “terminating an 
employee based on the employee’s consensual sexual conduct does 
not violate Title VII.”97 But the court based this observation primarily 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 907. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 910. 
 95. Id. at 908–09. 
 96. Id. at 909. 
 97. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.2d 902, 
903, 905 (11th Cir. 1990); Kahn v. Objective Solutions, Int’l, 86 F. Supp. 2d 377, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000); Campbell v. Masten, 955 F. Supp. 526, 529 (D. Md. 1997); Freeman v. Cont’l Technical 
Serv., Inc., 710 F. Supp. 328, 331 (D. Ga. 1988)). 
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on cases involving consensual sexual relationships98 that were properly 
dismissed based on the traditional rule that Title VII does not 
prohibit terminations resulting from romantic relationships.99 
The Eighth Circuit ultimately concluded that Title VII does not 
prohibit terminations resulting from an “employee’s admitted 
consensual sexual conduct with an employer” and held that the 
termination did not constitute sex discrimination.100 The court 
emphasized the employer’s desire to calm his wife following the 
employee’s admitted sexual conduct and found this to be the 
“ultimate basis” for the termination.101 
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Tenge extended the romantic-
relationship rule to encompass not only terminations based on sexual 
or romantic relationships, but also those based on sexually suggestive 
employee conduct.102 But the Eighth Circuit declined to address 
whether terminating an employee because she is perceived to 
threaten a marriage would constitute unlawful discrimination if the 
employee has not engaged in sexually suggestive conduct.103 
C. Judicial Reliance on Favoritism and Romantic-Relationship 
Precedents in Nelson 
When Nelson was decided, Platner and Tenge were the leading 
cases involving sex-discrimination claims arising from romantic 
jealousy. Predictably, the Iowa Supreme Court relied on Platner and 
Tenge in dismissing Melissa Nelson’s claim, but the court 
characterized both cases as dismissing sex-discrimination claims based 
on favoritism precedents. Under the Nelson court’s analysis, the 
“unstated reasoning” in Tenge was that “if a specific instance of 
sexual favoritism does not constitute gender discrimination, treating 
an employee unfavorably because of such a relationship does not 
violate the law either.”104 Similarly, the court endorsed the view that 
the employer in Platner had acted based on “favoritism for a close 
 
 98. Id. at 909. 
 99. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 100. Tenge, 446 F.3d at 909–10. 
 101. Id. at 910. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 910 n.5. 
 104. Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 67–68 (Iowa 2013). 
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relative” because he chose to burden an unrelated employee rather 
than an employee who was also a relative.105 
The Nelson majority repeatedly emphasized that Dr. Knight’s 
wife perceived Nelson to be a threat to her marriage.106 The court 
recalled the circumstances that led to Mrs. Knight’s demand for 
Nelson’s termination, including her discovery that Dr. Knight had 
texted Nelson while vacationing with their children107 and her 
perception that Nelson was flirtatious with Dr. Knight and cold 
toward her.108 Mrs. Knight also believed that Nelson liked being alone 
in the office with Dr. Knight after hours, and she thought it “strange 
that after being at work all day and away from her kids and husband 
[Nelson was not] anxious to get home like the other [women] in the 
office.”109 
In describing the interactions between Nelson and Dr. Knight, 
the court focused on conduct that could suggest that the two had 
something other than an ordinary working relationship. The court 
recounted that during the final six months of Nelson’s employment 
she and Dr. Knight began texting each other about work matters and 
innocuous personal matters.110 In particular, the court recalled that in 
a moment of frustration with a coworker, Nelson once sent Dr. 
Knight a text saying he was the “only reason” she continued to work 
in the office.111 The court also focused on the suggestive nature of 
texts sent by Dr. Knight.112 For example, Dr. Knight once sent Nelson 
 
 105. Id. at 69 & n.4 (quoting Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.2d 902, 905 
(11th Cir. 1990)). 
 106. Id. at 66, 67, 69, 71. 
 107. Id. at 66. 
 108. Id. Nelson denied flirting with Dr. Knight or desiring an intimate or sexual relationship 
with him. Id. at 65. 
 109. Id. at 66 (second alteration in original); id. at 71 n.5. The court explicitly acknowledged 
that “in isolation, this statement could be an example of a gender-based stereotype” but 
apparently concluded that it did not constitute a stereotype because it “was linked to a specific 
concern about Nelson’s relationship with [Dr. Knight].” See id. 
 110. Id. at 65–66. The court noted that both Dr. Knight and Nelson were parents and “some 
of the texts involved updates on the kids’ activities and other relatively innocuous matters.” Id. 
at 65. 
 111. Id. at 66; id. at 78 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially). 
 112. Id. at 66 (majority opinion). The concurring justices described the texts as being “an 
undeniable part of the consensual personal relationship enjoyed by Nelson and Dr. Knight” that 
“revealed a relationship that was much different than would reasonably be expected to exist 
between employers and employees in the workplace.” Id. at 78 (Cady, C.J., concurring 
specially). 
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a text inquiring how frequently she orgasmed.113 Although the justices 
acknowledged that Nelson did not reply, they emphasized that she 
could “not remember ever telling Dr. Knight not to text her or telling 
him that she was offended.”114 On another occasion, Dr. Knight sent 
Nelson a text indicating that her shirt was too tight,115 and Nelson 
replied that “she did not think he was being fair”116 because he did not 
react the same way when other employees “really did wear tight, 
revealing, and inappropriate clothing.”117 Dr. Knight responded that 
“it was a good thing Nelson did not wear tight pants too because then 
he would get it coming and going.”118 Nelson denied that her clothing 
was inappropriate, but she testified that Dr. Knight occasionally 
complained that her clothing was “distracting.”119 Dr. Knight admitted 
that he once told her that if his pants were “bulging,” that meant her 
clothing was “too revealing.”120 In a separate incident, Dr. Knight 
mentioned an article he had read suggesting that frequent sex helps 
prevent prostate cancer, and Nelson replied with a comment 
suggesting that she had sex infrequently.121 Dr. Knight admitted that 
he responded by telling her that was “like having a Lamborghini in 
the garage and never driving it.”122 
Presumably due to the procedural posture of Nelson’s appeal,123 
the Iowa Supreme Court credited her assertion that she was not fired 
due to her own conduct and described the issue before the court as 
the one left open in Tenge.124 Specifically, the court framed the 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 66 (majority opinion). 
 115. Id.; id. at 78 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially). 
 116. Id. at 66 (majority opinion). 
 117. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 99. 
 118. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 66; id. at 78 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially). 
 119. Id. at 65 n.3 (majority opinion). Nelson typically wore scrubs at the office, but she 
sometimes removed her lab coat to reveal a fitted long-sleeve crewneck t-shirt or changed into 
workout clothes before heading to the gym. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 43, 62, 70, 99, 122–
23, 129, 133. 
 120. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 66. 
 121. See Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 115, 127 (describing the context in which Nelson 
made the statement about infrequency in her sex life). 
 122. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 66. 
 123. Id. at 65 (“Because this case was decided on summary judgment, we set forth the facts 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Melissa Nelson.”). 
 124. See id. at 68–69 (quoting Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 910 n.5 (8th 
Cir. 2006)) (noting that Nelson claimed that she “did not do anything to get herself fired except 
exist as a female” and argued that this distinguished her situation from that of the employee in 
Tenge). 
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question presented as “whether an employee who has not engaged in 
flirtatious conduct may be lawfully terminated simply because the 
boss’s spouse views the relationship between the boss and the 
employee as a threat to her marriage.”125 In answering that question, 
the court characterized federal case law derived from the context of 
consensual sexual relationships as yielding the principle that an 
“adverse employment action stemming from a consensual workplace 
relationship . . . is not actionable under Title VII” because “an 
isolated employment decision based on personal relations . . . is 
driven entirely by individual feelings and emotions regarding a 
specific person” and is not based on “factors that might be a proxy for 
gender.” 126 The court determined that the same principle applied to 
Nelson’s claim because Nelson had a “personal relationship” with Dr. 
Knight127 that was “consensual.”128 
The Iowa Supreme Court ultimately held that an employer who 
terminates an employee because his wife is “concerned about the 
nature of the relationship between the employer and employee” has 
not committed unlawful sex discrimination.129 The court dismissed the 
argument that an employer should not be able to avoid liability for 
discrimination by terminating an employee “to avoid committing 
sexual harassment,” reasoning that sexual harassment creates a hostile 
atmosphere, whereas terminating an employee to avoid harassing her 
“by definition does not bring about that atmosphere.”130 The court 
also dismissed the argument that denying discrimination claims based 
on jealousy in the absence of “employee misconduct” would allow 
employers to avoid liability for discrimination simply by claiming to 
have jealous spouses, reasoning that employees could still prevail by 
showing that jealousy was a pretext for a decision based on gender.131 
Though the court acknowledged that an assessment that Nelson failed 
to conform to a gender stereotype might have supported her claim, it 
 
 125. Id. at 69. 
 126. Id. at 70 (emphasis added) (citing Benders v. Bellows & Bellows, 515 F.3d 757, 768 (7th 
Cir. 2008); Blackshear v. Interstate Brands Corp., 495 F. App’x 613, 617 (6th Cir. 2012); West v. 
MCI Worldcom, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 531, 544–45 (E.D. Va. 2002)). 
 127. See id. (citing Tenge, 446 F.3d at 905–06) (describing Nelson as being like Tenge in that 
it involved “a personal relationship between the owner of a small business and a valued 
employee of the business that was seen by the owner’s wife as a threat to their marriage.”) 
 128. Id. at 65, 70, 72.  
 129. Id. at 65 (emphasis added). 
 130. Id. at 72 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786–90 (1998)). 
 131. Id. at 70–71. 
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suggested that the existence of a “personal relationship” between her 
and Dr. Knight eliminated any possibility that a gender stereotype 
had motivated her termination.132 
Given that romantic jealousy by definition involves concern 
about the nature of a relationship,133 Nelson strongly suggests that a 
termination resulting from romantic jealousy can never support a sex-
discrimination claim.134 But the majority opinion was supplemented by 
a special concurrence intended “to further explain the basis and 
rationale for the decision” that reinforced the centrality of the 
“personal relationship” between Nelson and Dr. Knight to the court’s 
analysis.135 The concurrence clarified that “Nelson was terminated 
because of the activities of her consensual personal relationship with 
her employer, not because of her gender” and suggested that whether 
a personal relationship existed was properly determined based on the 
conduct of both parties.136 Looking to the conduct of Nelson and Dr. 
Knight, the concurring justices explained that the record reflected 
“enough activity and conduct to support a determination as a matter 
of law that Nelson was terminated as a response to the consensual 
personal relationship she maintained with Dr. Knight.”137 They 
reasoned that although Dr. Knight’s sexual comments were 
inappropriate for the workplace, “they nevertheless were an 
undeniable part of the consensual personal relationship enjoyed by 
Nelson and Dr. Knight.”138 Moreover, even if Nelson was terminated 
because Dr. Knight was physically attracted to her, her termination 
 
 132. See id. at 71–72 (concluding that “the critical difference” between Nelson and a case in 
which an employee was terminated for her failure to conform with gender stereotypes was that 
“Nelson indisputably lost her job because Dr. Knight’s spouse objected to the parties’ 
relationship”). The court acknowledged that Mrs. Knight’s statement that she found it “strange 
that after being at work all day and away from her kids and husband [Nelson was not] anxious 
to get home like the other [women] in the office” might have been an example of a gender 
stereotype. Id. at 71 n.5. It concluded, however, that the statement was not a stereotype because 
it “was linked to a specific concern” by Mrs. Knight about the relationship between Nelson and 
her husband. Id. at 66, 71 n.5.  
 133. See infra Part III.A. 
 134. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 65 (concluding that an employer may terminate an employee 
because his spouse, “due to no fault of the employee, is concerned about the nature of the 
relationship between the employer and the employee”). 
 135. Id. at 73 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially). 
 136. Id. at 78. 
 137. Id. at 79–80. 
 138. Id. at 78. 
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did not constitute sex discrimination because his attraction “surfaced 
during and resulted from the personal relationship.”139 
III.  ANALYZING ROMANTIC JEALOUSY AS A BASIS FOR SEX-
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
Setting aside the question of whether it is appropriate for courts 
to rely on favoritism and romantic-relationship precedents to 
foreclose romantic-jealousy claims, the question remains whether an 
affirmative argument can be made that terminations resulting from 
jealousy constitute unlawful sex discrimination.140 This Part attempts 
to answer that question. It begins by defining romantic jealousy and 
explaining why mixed-motive analysis is the appropriate framework 
for determining whether a particular termination resulting from 
romantic jealousy constitutes unlawful discrimination. It then 
considers the form that analysis should take and concludes that 
determining whether unlawful discrimination has occurred necessarily 
depends on the circumstances giving rise to romantic jealousy. 
A. Selecting the Appropriate Framework for Romantic-Jealousy 
Claims 
Philosophers141 and social scientists142 have long distinguished 
between jealousy and envy, though courts143 and laypersons144 tend to 
 
 139. Id. at 79. 
 140. Note that like the opinions in Platner and Tenge, the Nelson opinion does not discuss 
whether there may be an affirmative argument for recognizing romantic-jealousy claims in the 
absence of precedents involving favoritism or relationships. All three opinions address the 
question of whether gender actually motivated the defendant–employer to terminate the 
plaintiff–employee in a conclusory manner. See Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 
910 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The ultimate basis for Tenge’s dismissal was not her sex, it was Scott’s 
desire to allay his wife’s concerns over Tenge’s admitted sexual behavior with him.”); Platner v. 
Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.2d 902, 905 (11th Cir. 1990) (“It is thus clear that the 
ultimate basis for Platner’s dismissal was not gender but simply favoritism for a close relative.”); 
Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 71–72 (majority opinion) (describing Nelson’s termination as resulting 
from the fact that Mrs. Knight, “unfairly or not, viewed her as a threat to her marriage” and 
objected to her relationship with Dr. Knight). 
 141. W. Gerrod Parrott & Richard H. Smith, Distinguishing the Experiences of Envy and 
Jealousy, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 906, 906 (1993) (“Philosophers from ancient 
times to the present have argued that envy and jealousy have distinct causes and experiences.” 
(citations omitted)); see generally Luke Purshouse, Jealousy in Relation to Envy, 60 
ERKENNTNIS 179 (2004) (surveying philosophical models distinguishing between jealousy and 
envy). 
 142. Parrott & Smith, supra note 141, at 906 (observing that many social psychologists and 
other social scientists distinguish between jealousy and envy). 
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use the terms interchangeably.145 Envy occurs when one experiences 
feelings such as inferiority, resentment, or ill will146 because one lacks 
and desires to possess something another person has.147 In contrast, 
jealousy occurs when a person experiences emotions such as 
apprehension, anxiety, and fear concerning the potential loss of 
something already possessed to another person.148 In other words, 
envy stems from the desire to get what someone else has, whereas 
jealousy stems from the desire to keep what one already has.149 
Romantic jealousy is a particular form of jealousy in which what one 
desires to retain is a romantic relationship.150 Thus, romantic jealousy 
occurs when one person perceives another person to be a romantic 
rival who threatens an existing romantic relationship.151 
 
 143. See, e.g., Blackshear v. Interstate Brands Corp., 495 F. App’x 613, 615, 617 (6th Cir. 
2012) (describing evidence suggesting that an employer was envious as supporting the 
conclusion that the employer was jealous); Barrett v. Kirtland Cmty. Coll., 628 N.W.2d 63, 67, 
74 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (referring to conduct resulting from envy as “conduct based on 
romantic jealousy”). At least one legal commentator has also observed the distinction. Jane 
Tucker, Note, Taming the Green-Eyed Monster: On the Need To Rethink Our Cultural 
Conception of Jealousy, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217, 224 (2013). 
 144. Peter Salovey & Judith Rodin, The Differentiation of Social-Comparison Jealousy and 
Romantic Jealousy, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1100, 1100 (1986). But see Parrott & 
Smith, supra note 141, at 906 (observing that research suggests that laypersons implicitly 
recognize the distinction between jealousy and envy). 
 145. Nonetheless, Homer Simpson accurately captured the distinction in an episode of the 
The Simpsons: “Jealousy is when you worry someone will take what you have. Envy is wanting 
what someone else has. What I feel is envy.” The Simpsons: Covercraft (FOX television 
broadcast Nov. 23, 2014). 
 146. Parrott & Smith, supra note 141, at 906.  
 147. Salovey & Rodin, supra note 144, at 1100 (citing Philip M. Spielman, Envy and 
Jealousy: An Attempt at Clarification, 40 PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 59, 59–82 (1971)). 
 148. Parrott & Smith, supra note 141, at 906–07; Salovey & Rodin, supra note 144, at 1100, 
1112. 
 149. Complicating this distinction is the fact that envy and jealousy may occur 
simultaneously arising out of the same set of circumstances. See Parrott & Smith, supra note 
141, at 907 (“When a person’s romantic partner gives attention to an attractive rival, that person 
may both be jealous of the special relationship with the partner and also envious of the rival for 
being so attractive.”). 
 150. Salovey & Rodin, supra note 144, at 1100. 
 151. Id. at 1112 (“When one’s relationship with another person is threatened by a rival . . . 
one experiences romantic jealousy as one imagines the loss of that relationship . . . .”); see also 
Stacie Y. Bauerle, James H. Amirkhan & Ralph B. Hupka, An Attribution Theory Analysis of 
Romantic Jealousy, 26 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 297, 310 (2002) (“The function of romantic 
jealousy may be viewed as a guardian of relationships. It is ignited by the jealous individual’s 
perception that the romantic partner’s interest in the rival poses a threat to the primary 
relationship.”).  
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The above description reveals the chief difficulty with sex-
discrimination claims involving jealousy: jealousy is not necessarily 
premised on biological sex or gender.152 Because sex and jealousy may 
be disaggregated in this way, jealousy does not constitute an 
inherently discriminatory basis for an employment decision. Recall 
that under the framework applicable to single-motive claims, an 
employee must demonstrate either that a protected characteristic was 
the reason for an employment decision or that the employer’s 
proffered nondiscriminatory reason for the decision was pretextual.153 
Once an employee demonstrates that jealousy would not have 
occurred but for her gender, an employer can rely on garden-variety 
jealousy as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for an employment 
decision because it is not inherently gendered.154 
One might be tempted to argue that the essential feature of 
romantic jealousy—the perception of a threat to an existing romantic 
relationship—supplies an adequate basis for recognizing that a 
resulting employment decision is inherently discriminatory. This 
argument recognizes that when a person believes her romantic 
partner has an exclusive sexual preference, that belief probably 
influences the likelihood that she will experience jealousy toward a 
specific rival.155 It assumes that under such circumstances biological 
sex or gender represents the dividing line between those she perceives 
to be potential romantic rivals and those she does not. This 
assumption translates to a claim that an employment decision based 
on romantic jealousy is inherently discriminatory when the employer 
is attracted exclusively to one biological sex or gender—a claim 
premised on the assumption that when an employer has an exclusive 
 
 152. For example, consider the following scenario. An office manager works in an office 
with her employer–husband, but she senses that he would prefer another employee with more 
accounting experience to be the office manager. She knows that having two employees devoted 
to office management is not feasible, given the size of the office. Fearing that she might lose the 
position if she does not act, she asks her employer–husband to fire the other employee because 
she is jealous. The employer–husband acquiesces and terminates the employee. This 
termination resulted from jealousy, but it was completely unrelated to the terminated 
employee’s gender. In fact, the gender of the terminated employee was not even specified in this 
example. 
 153. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 155. Cf. Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 75 n.9 (Iowa 2013) (Cady, 
C.J., concurring specially) (implying that sexuality plays a role in romantic jealousy by 
emphasizing that the case was evaluated in the context of heterosexual relationships). 
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sexual preference, romantic jealousy would not have occurred but for 
the gender of the terminated employee. 
The argument that an employment decision based on romantic 
jealousy is inherently discriminatory is problematic and unpersuasive. 
The difficulties arise primarily because the argument proceeds from 
the premise that the employer has an exclusive sexual orientation. 
From a normative perspective, undesirable consequences flow from 
relying on the sexual orientation of the employer to provide the 
causal link between sex and an employment decision. Such reliance 
implies that some employees, namely those terminated by bisexual 
employers, are entitled to less protection from employment-
discrimination laws than others.156 But practical difficulties would 
likely result from linking recognition of romantic-jealousy claims to 
the sexual orientation of employers. For example, parties might 
debate which classification best fits a particular employer or what the 
outcome should be if the spouse’s perception of an employer’s 
sexuality does not perfectly align with his past sexual behavior. 
From a doctrinal perspective, because the argument that 
romantic jealousy is inherently discriminatory implies that sex and 
romantic jealousy cannot be disaggregated, it suggests that the 
appropriate framework for analysis of romantic-jealousy claims is the 
pretext framework applicable to single-motive claims.157 Under this 
framework, however, an employer could claim that his desire to 
alleviate jealousy experienced by his romantic partner constituted a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating an employee. To 
prove that the employer’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason was 
pretextual would require the employee to undermine the very basis 
for her claim. Consequently, the argument that romantic jealousy is 
inherently based on sex does not function effectively as an argument 
in favor of recognizing that romantic jealousy may be a discriminatory 
basis for an employment decision. 
Further analysis illuminates why courts should be skeptical of the 
argument that romantic jealousy is inherently premised on sex. 
Assume for a moment that gender and sexual preference must align 
in order to cause jealousy. Though such alignment may be necessary 
to trigger romantic jealousy, it may not be sufficient to do so. For 
example, a woman married to a heterosexual man may experience 
 
 156. Cf. id. (“Both Nelson and Dr. Knight are married to opposite-sex spouses, and this case 
is evaluated in that context.”). 
 157. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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romantic jealousy toward only women,158 but she will not necessarily 
experience romantic jealousy toward all other women. The existence 
of romantic jealousy standing alone is fundamentally insufficient to 
show that biological sex or gender actually motivated a particular 
instance of romantic jealousy, even though biological sex or gender 
may limit the circumstances under which jealousy may arise. 
Consequently, the argument that romantic jealousy is inherently 
based on sex is not only inadequate to support a sex-discrimination 
claim under the pretext framework, but also inadequate to support a 
sex-discrimination claim under the mixed-motive framework, which 
requires an employee to demonstrate that sex was a motivating factor 
in an employment decision.159 
More fundamentally, however, the foregoing illustration 
demonstrates that sex and romantic jealousy can be disaggregated. 
Because sex alone does not produce romantic jealousy, romantic 
jealousy is not the product of a single motive. Rather, when romantic 
jealousy occurs, more than one motive is at work. Thus, mixed-motive 
analysis in sex-discrimination claims based on romantic jealousy is 
appropriate. This raises the question of how an employee could 
demonstrate that sex actually motivated an employment decision that 
resulted from romantic jealousy. 
B. Applying Mixed-Motive Analysis to Romantic-Jealousy Claims 
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, it would be 
inappropriate to assume that an employer was motivated by sex 
merely because he admitted to terminating an employee once his 
spouse experienced jealousy. Because jealousy is not inherently 
gendered,160 determining whether gender was a motivating factor in a 
termination requires an examination of the circumstances giving rise 
to jealousy. Do those circumstances suggest that an impermissible 
motive was at work when the jealousy arose? 
The seminal case, Price Waterhouse, illustrates the importance of 
examining the circumstances that resulted in a termination when 
 
 158. As previously noted, the gender of the parties in the hypothetical scenarios presented 
in this Note corresponds to the gender of the employer and employee in Nelson. See supra note 
63. This is not intended to suggest that women are more likely than men to experience romantic 
jealousy. For a recent summary of studies concerning sex differences in the experience of 
romantic jealousy, see Tucker, supra note 143, at 233. 
 159. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra notes 148, 152. 
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assessing mixed-motive sex-discrimination claims.161 Attorney Ann 
Hopkins had received consistent praise from partners and clients 
alike for her competence and performance, but she was denied 
partnership because of “perceived shortcomings” relating to her 
“abrasiveness.”162 In analyzing Hopkins’ sex-discrimination claim, the 
Supreme Court recounted the “clear signs” that some partners’ 
negative reactions to Hopkins were influenced by the fact that she 
was a woman: 
One partner described her as “macho”; another suggested that she 
“overcompensated for being a woman”; a third advised her to take 
“a course at charm school[.”] Several partners criticized her use of 
profanity; in response, one partner suggested that those partners 
objected to her swearing only “because it’s a lady using foul 
language.” Another supporter explained that Hopkins “ha[d] 
matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed 
[manager] to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing 
lady [partner] candidate.” But it was the man who . . . bore 
responsibility for explaining to Hopkins the reasons for the . . . 
decision to place her candidacy on hold who delivered the coup de 
grace: in order to improve her chances for partnership, Thomas 
Beyer advised, Hopkins should “walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair 
styled, and wear jewelry.”163 
In describing the proper approach to assessing whether gender 
impermissibly motivated an employment decision, the Court 
indicated that judges must consider whether, if asked “at the moment 
of the decision what its reasons were” for making an employment 
decision, a truthful employer would admit that “one of those reasons 
[was] that the . . . employee was a woman.”164 It went on to explain 
that “an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman 
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis 
of gender.”165 As the Court’s analysis illustrates, mixed-motive 
analysis does not ask merely whether an employer’s stated reason for 
an employment decision inherently implicates biological sex or 
 
 161. Recall that Price Waterhouse was the case that legitimized mixed-motive analysis and 
led to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See supra notes 38–51. 
 162. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231–32, 234–35 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
 163. Id. at 235 (citations omitted). 
 164. Id. at 250–51. 
 165. Id. 
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gender. Rather, mixed-motive analysis looks behind the stated reason 
to ask whether the employer actually weighed assessments of the 
employee motivated by biological sex or gender in reaching an 
employment decision. 
Romantic jealousy involves an assessment that a person 
constitutes a threat to an existing relationship.166 When an employer 
acknowledges that he terminated a particular employee due to 
romantic jealousy, he also acknowledges that in making the decision 
to terminate the employee he considered an assessment that the 
employee represented a threat to his existing relationship. Thus, in 
analyzing romantic-jealousy claims brought under the mixed-motive 
framework, the operative question is whether the circumstances 
suggest that, more likely than not, biological sex or gender motivated 
an assessment that a particular employee threatened the relationship 
between the employer and his spouse. 
Answering this question in any particular case requires an 
examination of the facts and circumstances giving rise to romantic 
jealousy. Yet it is also possible to identify paradigmatic situations 
suggesting that gender impermissibly motivated how an employee 
came to be perceived as a threat to an employer’s existing romantic 
relationship. This is not to say that an individualized factual 
assessment is not required in every case. Rather, the point is that 
when the facts demonstrate that one of these situations is present, 
they also suggest that gender motivated the assessment that the 
employee represented a threat and thus constituted an impermissible 
motivating factor in any employment decision resulting therefrom. 
The following subsections describe three paradigmatic situations in 
which one might reasonably conclude that gender motivated an 
assessment that an employee represented a threat to an employer’s 
existing relationship. 
1. Sexual Attraction and Sexual Attractiveness.  One can imagine 
how romantic jealousy could arise as a consequence of assessments 
concerning the sexual attractiveness of an employee. An employer 
could express that he finds a particular employee to be sexually 
attractive. Or his romantic partner might believe he is attracted to a 
particular employee based on her own assessment of the employee’s 
attractiveness or her beliefs concerning the likelihood that he would 
 
 166. See supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text. 
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find the employee to be attractive. In either case, the employee is 
assessed in terms of sexual attractiveness. 
Outside the romantic-jealousy context, legal scholars167 and 
courts168 have recognized that employment decisions motivated by 
assessments concerning the physical attractiveness of employees may 
constitute actionable discrimination. One theory for recognizing that 
assessments of sexual attractiveness bring employment decisions 
within the purview of Title VII frames such assessments as the 
product of impermissible sex stereotypes.169 Other theories supply 
alternative bases for arriving at the same result.170 Whatever the 
underlying theory, the critical point for the analysis at hand is that an 
assessment concerning the attractiveness of an employee may reflect 
that gender played an impermissible motivating role in an 
employment decision. 
2. Conformity with Sex Stereotypes.  It is easy to see how 
assessments of employees based on sex stereotypes could contribute 
to romantic jealousy. For example, romantic jealousy may result from 
 
 167. See, e.g., Enbar Toledano, The Looking-Glass Ceiling: Appearance-Based 
Discrimination in the Workplace, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 683, 700 (2013) (“[A]ppearance-
based employment decisions may bring an employer’s actions under the purview of a relevant 
statute if they are sufficiently related to an individual’s federally protected status.”).  
 168. See, e.g., Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1041–42, 1043 (8th Cir. 
2010) (reversing summary judgment in favor of an employer because the employee produced 
evidence that the employer required women filling a particular position to be “pretty” and 
criticized an employee’s appearance); Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 77 
(Iowa 2013) (Cady, C.J., concurring specially) (“[A]n employer cannot legally fire an employee 
simply because the employer finds the employee too attractive or not attractive enough.” (citing 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion); Lewis, 591 F.3d at 
1037)). 
 169. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 77 (“It is abundantly clear that a woman does not lose the 
protection of our laws prohibiting sex discrimination just because her employer becomes 
sexually attracted to her, and the employer’s attraction then becomes the reason for terminating 
the woman once it, in some way, becomes a problem for the employer. If a woman is terminated 
based on stereotypes related to the characteristics of her gender, including attributes of 
attractiveness, the termination would amount to sex discrimination because the reason for 
termination would be motivated by the particular gender attribute at issue.”). 
 170. For example, one legal scholar has noted that early precedents recognizing a cause of 
action for sexual harassment under Title VII “relied on a sexual-desire-based notion of 
causation” in which “the causal mechanism bringing harassment within the prohibition of Title 
VII is the heterosexual feelings of attraction, lust, or desire that motivate the male harasser to 
act upon a female employee.” David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation 
Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1719–20 (2002). Under this 
theory, “Discrimination in the sense of exercising a preference . . . for women rather than men 
as sex objects . . . becomes sex discrimination in the invidious sense because the targeted woman 
is disadvantaged relative to her male co-workers.” Id. at 1720. 
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an employer working closely with a woman perceived to conform to 
the stereotype of the “brazen temptress”171 or the “sexually-
accommodating secretary.”172 Conversely, romantic jealousy may stem 
from an employer working closely with a woman who fails to conform 
to stereotypes depicting women as caregivers173 or “pure, delicate and 
vulnerable creature[s].”174 In some circumstances, another protected 
characteristic of an employee, such as her race or her age, may 
contribute to the decision to assess her according to a particular 
stereotype. 
Importantly, adverse employment actions resulting from 
consideration of sex stereotypes fall within the scope of Title VII’s 
protections.175 The critical question appears to be one of causation 
with respect to the employment decision. In other words, did 
assessment of the employee according to a sex stereotype lead to an 
 
 171. See, e.g., John D. Johnston, Jr. & Charles L. Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A 
Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 704–05 (1971) (describing the stereotype of 
a woman “as a brazen temptress, from whose seductive blandishments the innocent male must 
be protected”); Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. REV. 359, 395–96 (2004) 
(observing that Title VII prohibits the use of stereotypes such as “woman as dangerous 
temptress” or “woman as siren” in making employment decisions). 
 172. See Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1390 (D. Colo. 1978) (noting 
the prevalence of the “stereotype of the sexually-accommodating secretary” in popular culture). 
 173. See Dédé Koffie-Lart & Christopher J. Tyson, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
6 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 615, 620 (2005) (observing that “[t]he recurring stereotype of woman as 
caregiver has generated numerous lawsuits”); McGinley, supra note 171, at 389, 393–94 
(observing that “women who do not comport to the female stereotype as caregiver are 
punished”). 
 174. See Johnston & Knapp, supra note 171, at 704–05 (observing that “the female is viewed 
as a pure, delicate and vulnerable creature who must be protected from exposure to immoral 
influences”). 
 175. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(“As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could 
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with 
their group, for ‘[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their 
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and 
women resulting from sex stereotypes.’” (quoting L.A. Dep’t. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 
435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978))); Terveer v. Billington, 34 F. Supp. 3d 100, 116 (D.D.C. 2014)  
(“Under Title VII, allegations that an employer is discriminating against an employee based on 
the employee’s non-conformity with sex stereotypes are sufficient to establish a viable sex 
discrimination claim.” (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251)); Nelson v. James H. Knight 
DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 77 (Iowa 2013) (Cady, C.J., concurring specially) (“If a woman is 
terminated based on stereotypes related to the characteristics of her gender, . . . the termination 
would amount to sex discrimination.” (citing Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 
2004))); Clare Diefenbach, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment After Oncale: Meeting the “Because of . 
. . Sex” Requirement, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 42, 80 (2007) (“[C]ourts have found 
that harassment based on a person’s failure to comport with gender stereotypes is actionable.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
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adverse employment decision? In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme 
Court recognized that sex stereotypes may impermissibly motivate an 
employer’s evaluation of an employee’s performance-related 
personality characteristics and implied that employment decisions 
motivated by sex stereotypes in other ways may be equally 
discriminatory.176 Thus, in the ensuing years, “sex-stereotyping 
jurisprudence has developed to protect many people who are 
discriminated against because of their failure to conform to a wide 
array of stereotypes about appropriate behavior and appearance for a 
particular sex.”177 
3. Sexually Suggestive Conduct.  Knowledge that an employer has 
engaged in sexually suggestive conduct toward an employee could 
also contribute to romantic jealousy. When an employer engages in 
sexually suggestive conduct toward a particular employee, his 
romantic partner might understandably perceive the employee to 
threaten her relationship with the employer. Depending on the nature 
of the employer’s conduct, it might be obvious that the employee’s 
gender played a motivating role in the employer’s decision to engage 
in sexually suggestive conduct toward her. That such conduct may be 
impermissibly motivated by gender is reflected in the fact that 
employers face potential liability for sexually harassing conduct 
toward employees even in the absence of jealousy.178 
Conversely, sexually suggestive conduct by an employee directed 
toward an employer does not suggest that any resulting termination 
was motivated by the employee’s gender. The employee who engaged 
in sexually suggestive conduct in the workplace, rather than her 
employer, is the actor whose conduct might have been motivated by 
 
 176. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (explaining that sex stereotypes are problematic 
because “Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and 
women resulting from sex stereotypes” (emphasis added) (quoting L.A. Dep’t. of Water & 
Power, 435 U.S. at 707 n.13) (quotation marks omitted)); id. at 243–44 (pointing to evidence 
that Congress recognized that “[t]o discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in 
treatment or favor, and those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are 
prohibited . . . are those which are based on any . . . forbidden criteria” (quoting 110 CONG. 
REC. 7213 (1964)) (quotation marks omitted)). 
 177. Sunish Gulati, Note, The Use of Gender-Loaded Identities in Sex-Stereotyping 
Jurisprudence, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2177, 2177 (2003); see Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 
591 F.3d 1033, 1038, 1042 (8th Cir. 2010) (reversing summary judgment for an employer in a 
case in which the employee alleged “that her employer found her unsuited for her job not 
because of her qualifications or her performance on the job, but because her appearance did not 
comport with its preferred feminine stereotype”). 
 178. See infra note 221 and accompanying text. 
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gender. Put another way, the gender motivations at play in this 
scenario flow away from, rather than toward, the employee. A court 
might deny a romantic-jealousy claim in such circumstances because 
the jealousy that led to the employee’s termination was motivated not 
by her gender, but by the gender of her employer. Alternatively, a 
court might conclude that the employee’s actions caused the jealousy 
that resulted in her termination.179 
C. The Results of Applying Mixed-Motive Analysis to Romantic-
Jealousy Claims 
Given that biological sex or gender need only be a motivating 
factor in an adverse employment decision to violate Title VII,180 the 
preceding analysis clarifies that the strength of the theoretical basis 
for recognizing a termination based on romantic jealousy as unlawful 
discrimination turns on the underlying circumstances of the particular 
case. It also demonstrates that when an employee is terminated 
because of romantic jealousy, the presence of certain paradigmatic 
situations may strongly suggest that the jealousy was motivated by 
gender. To the extent that these situations commonly motivate 
jealousy, the foregoing analysis suggests that many employment 
decisions resulting from romantic jealousy violate Title VII. But 
critically, the outcome of a romantic-jealousy claim never turns 
merely on the employee’s ability to show that jealousy existed. 
Rather, it turns on the employee’s ability to point to specific facts 
suggesting that the employer considered an assessment of the 
employee motivated by gender in making an employment decision. 
Note the common thread that runs between the paradigmatic 
situations described above. Namely, each represents a situation 
involving conduct that could independently support liability under 
Title VII in the absence of jealousy. When the circumstances giving 
rise to jealousy could not lawfully serve as the basis for an 
employment decision, it makes sense to recognize that unlawful 
discrimination has occurred. An employer cannot lawfully terminate 
an employee based on feelings of attraction toward her181 or based on 
the degree to which she conforms with gender stereotypes.182 
Similarly, an employer who engages in sexually suggestive conduct 
 
 179. See supra notes 96–97, 100–01 and accompanying text. 
 180. See supra Part I and notes 164–65 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra notes 175, 177 and accompanying text. 
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toward an employee may be liable for sexual harassment.183 When the 
sort of conduct that could support Title VII liability gives rise to 
jealousy and an employee is terminated as a result, the fact that such 
conduct occurred constitutes evidence that gender probably 
motivated that jealousy and any resulting termination.184 
Importantly, the theoretical basis for recognizing that sex 
discrimination has occurred is not diminished simply because the 
employer himself was not the individual who became jealous. By 
making an employment decision based on the jealousy of his romantic 
partner, an employer effectively adopts that jealousy and its 
underlying motivations as the basis for his decision. Furthermore, the 
jealous person may be an employee in addition to being the 
employer’s romantic partner.185 An employment relationship between 
an employer and his romantic partner may serve as an additional 
basis for imputing the partner’s discriminatory motives to the 
employer. The Supreme Court recently held that the discriminatory 
motives of supervisors may be imputed to employers.186 Thus, an 
employer may be liable for the discriminatory motives of an 
employee–spouse who stands in the relationship of supervisor to a 
terminated employee. The Court explicitly left open the question of 
whether the discriminatory motives of nonsupervisory coworkers that 
influence the ultimate decision to terminate an employee may also be 
imputed to employers.187 However, the argument that an employer 
should be liable when sex motivates an employee–spouse is stronger 
than the argument that an employer should be liable when sex 
motivates a nonspouse employee. This is particularly true when an 
 
 183. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65–67 (1986) (describing sexual 
harassment prohibited by Title VII). 
 184. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (observing that “sex 
stereotypes do not inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular employment 
decision” but “can certainly be evidence that gender played a part”). 
 185. For example, the person experiencing jealousy was an employee in Nelson, Platner, and 
Tenge. Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 903 (8th Cir. 2006); Platner v. Cash & 
Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.3d 902, 903 (11th Cir. 1990); Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, 
P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Iowa 2013). 
 186. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1192–93 (2011) (“Since a supervisor is an agent 
of the employer, when he causes an adverse employment action the employer causes it; and 
when discrimination is a motivating factor in his doing so, it is a ‘motivating factor in the 
employer’s action,’ precisely as the text requires.”). Though Staub addressed the question of 
employer liability for the discriminatory motives of supervisors in the context of the Uniformed 
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), the Court explicitly 
acknowledged that USERRA is “is very similar to Title VII.” Id. at 1191.  
 187. Id. at 1194 n.4. 
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employer explicitly adopts the jealousy experienced by an employee–
spouse as the reason for terminating another employee.  
Nonetheless, an employer found liable for sex discrimination 
under mixed-motive analysis may be able to limit damages. For 
example, assume that an employee has pointed to facts demonstrating 
that gender motivated the romantic jealousy her employer cited as 
the reason for her termination. Under the mixed-motive framework, 
she is entitled to prevail on the question of liability, but she will not 
receive compensatory damages if her employer can demonstrate that 
he would have made the same decision had he not been 
impermissibly motivated by gender.188 This raises the question of 
whether the employer could argue that jealousy is not inherently 
gendered and point to the jealousy experienced by his spouse to 
prove his same-decision defense. Under Title VII, however, an 
employer may limit damages only if he demonstrates that he “would 
have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible 
motivating factor.”189 Thus, when an employee shows that gender 
played a motivating role in bringing about the jealousy that caused 
her termination, the employer loses his ability to point to that 
jealousy as a legitimate reason for deciding to terminate her. In other 
words, the employer could limit damages only if he could point to a 
legitimate reason for terminating the employee that was independent 
of the jealousy experienced by his spouse. 
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, a mere accusation that 
jealousy was the reason for an employment decision is an insufficient 
basis to conclude that gender motivated that decision. From an 
employer’s admission that romantic jealousy was the sole reason for 
his decision to terminate an employee, it does not necessarily follow 
that his decision was motivated by gender. But the fact that romantic 
jealousy is not always gender-motivated does not mean that it never 
is. Thus, mixed-motive analysis of romantic-jealousy claims calls for 
careful assessment of the circumstances to determine whether gender 
actually motivated the jealousy that led an employer to terminate his 
employee. Only by engaging in this analysis can courts properly 
 
 188. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012). As envisioned by the Supreme Court in Price 
Waterhouse before the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text, 
the same-decision defense required an employer to “show that its legitimate reason, standing 
alone, would have induced it to make the same decision.” Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228, 252 (1989) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
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distinguish between claims that are entitled to relief and claims that 
are not. 
IV.  RECONSIDERING THE APPLICATION OF FAVORITISM AND 
ROMANTIC-RELATIONSHIP PRECEDENTS TO ROMANTIC-JEALOUSY 
CLAIMS 
Assuming that gender motivates some jealousy-based 
terminations, the question then becomes whether courts should apply 
favoritism and romantic-relationship precedents to dismiss romantic-
jealousy claims. This Part argues that the rationales supporting the 
dismissal of sex-discrimination claims arising in the context of 
favoritism and romantic relationships do not justify the dismissal of 
sex-discrimination claims arising in the context of romantic jealousy. 
In addition, this Part illustrates why Nelson’s extension of the rule 
prohibiting sex-discrimination claims arising in the context of 
romantic relationships to prohibit claims arising in the context of 
nonromantic personal relationships is deeply problematic. 
A. Reconsidering the Limits of Favoritism Precedents 
Employment decisions based on favoritism and employment 
decisions based on romantic jealousy unquestionably share some 
similarities. In both circumstances, employment decisions are not 
based on an employee possessing or lacking work-related skills or 
qualifications.190 Furthermore, in both circumstances, employment 
decisions are intended to benefit an individual with whom an 
employer has a relationship. Given these similarities, courts have 
predictably applied favoritism precedents in deciding sex-
discrimination claims based on romantic jealousy.191 But employment 
decisions based on favoritism differ from those based on romantic 
jealousy in significant respects, suggesting that this practice lacks a 
stable doctrinal foundation. This Subsection demonstrates that these 
underlying differences are sufficiently important to counsel against 
reliance on favoritism precedents in analyzing romantic-jealousy 
claims. 
Employment decisions based on favoritism and those based on 
romantic jealousy differ in purpose. Decisions based on favoritism 
 
 190. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 683 (9th ed. 2009) (defining favoritism as being “based 
on factors other than merit”). 
 191. See supra Part II.A. 
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typically occur when an employer seeks to confer an employment 
benefit on another person based on his relationship with that 
individual.192 In another conceivable variant of favoritism, the 
employer refrains from imposing an adverse employment 
consequence on the favored employee. Whatever action the employer 
takes, his primary goal is to engage in favorable treatment toward the 
favored employee, whether directly (by granting a benefit) or 
indirectly (by preventing a harm). The resulting harm to other 
employees is a secondary consequence of achieving this primary goal. 
The employer is not unlawfully motivated to single out a particular 
employee for unfavorable treatment on the basis of a protected 
characteristic. 
In contrast, decisions based on romantic jealousy involve an 
employer imposing an adverse employment action on a particular 
employee because she has become the object of jealousy. Although 
the employer’s primary purpose might be to alleviate his romantic 
partner’s jealousy, the employer terminates a particular employee to 
accomplish that purpose. And as the preceding analysis has shown, an 
unlawful motivation may underlie the jealousy the employer seeks to 
alleviate.193 
That gender may have a causal connection to employment 
decisions based on romantic jealousy further distinguishes those 
decisions from employment decisions based on favoritism. Gender 
has no causal connection to employment decisions made to favor a 
family member or a friend.194 And although sex may motivate 
employment decisions favoring a paramour, the causal connection 
flows from the employer to the favored employee rather than from 
the employer to the disfavored employee.195 But when an employment 
decision is based on romantic jealousy motivated by gender, the sex 
 
 192. See supra Part II.A. 
 193. See supra Part III.B. 
 194. See Mary Anne Case, A Few Words in Favor of Cultivating an Incest Taboo in the 
Workplace, 33 VT. L. REV. 551, 555 (2009) (reasoning that nepotism is not sex discrimination 
because “no one of any sex, other than this particular person, could have gotten the job”); 
Poole, supra note 29, at 858 (noting that “[k]inship is largely an accident of birth”). 
 195. Poole, supra note 29, at 849 (“In sexual favoritism cases, it is the paramour’s gender, 
not the victim’s, that partially motivates the employer or supervisor.” (citing Michael J. Phillips, 
The Dubious Title VII Cause of Action for Sexual Favoritism, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 547, 570 
(1994))). 
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of the harmed employee is causally connected to the employer’s 
decision.196 
As this analysis demonstrates, employment decisions based on 
favoritism fundamentally differ from those based on romantic 
jealousy. Critically, these differences illuminate why the primary 
rationale for the rule that employment decisions based on favoritism 
do not constitute sex discrimination does not apply to decisions based 
on romantic jealousy. As the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) has recognized, “favoritism toward a 
‘paramour’ (or a spouse, or a friend) may be unfair, but it does not 
discriminate against women or men in violation of Title VII, since 
both are disadvantaged for reasons other than their genders.”197 In 
contrast, an isolated instance of romantic jealousy does not 
disadvantage both genders equally. Rather, the resulting employment 
decision impacts only one employee, and thus only one gender. 
Admittedly, it might be that the employer acted for reasons wholly 
unmotivated by gender, or it might be that gender played a 
motivating role.198 The key distinction is that it is impossible to 
determine whether gender motivated an employment decision arising 
due to jealousy without looking into the circumstances. 
B. Reconsidering the Limits of Romantic-Relationship Precedents 
Courts have consistently refused to recognize sex-discrimination 
claims when there is a consensual sexual or romantic relationship 
 
 196. See supra Part III.B–C. Admittedly, the significance of this distinction in mixed-motive 
analysis is unclear. The lack of clarity stems from the fact that although 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) 
clearly provides that unlawful discrimination occurs when gender is a motivating factor in an 
employment decision, it does not specify whose gender may not be considered. Consequently, 
§ 2000e-2(m) may be interpreted to forbid any employment decision motivated by gender, 
including an employment decision motivated by the gender of a person other than the adversely 
impacted employee. Phillips, supra note 195, at 569 & n.110. But § 2000e-2(m) may also be 
interpreted to provide that an employment decision constitutes unlawful discrimination only if 
the gender of the adversely impacted employee motivated the employer. Phillips, supra note 
197, at 570–71; Poole, supra note 29, at 849. Because the introductory clause of § 2000e-2(m) 
contains the qualifier “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subchapter,” it is arguably 
significant for purposes of interpreting § 2000e-2(m) that § 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment 
discrimination against any individual “because of such individual’s” protected characteristic. 
Phillips, supra note 197, at 570–71; Poole, supra note 29, at 849. 
 197. U.S. EEOC, NOTICE NO. 915.048, POLICY GUIDANCE ON EMPLOYER LIABILITY 
UNDER TITLE VII FOR SEXUAL FAVORITISM (1990), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
policy/docs/sexualfavor.html (citing Benzies v. Ill. Dep’t of Mental Health, 810 F.2d 146, 148 
(7th Cir. 1987); Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 1985)).  
 198. See supra Part III.B. 
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between employer and employee.199 But in cases involving 
terminations resulting from romantic jealousy, courts have extended 
the general rule that claims arising in the context of romantic 
relationships are not actionable under Title VII to claims arising 
outside the context of such relationships.200 This Subsection considers 
whether the rationales for the romantic-relationship rule justify 
courts’ extension of the rule to dismiss discrimination claims based 
either on sexually suggestive employee conduct or the existence of 
nonromantic personal relationships between employers and 
employees. 
The primary rationale underlying the rule that Title VII does not 
apply to claims stemming from romantic relationships is that Title VII 
prohibits making employment decisions “based on a person’s sex, not 
his or her sexual affiliations.”201 Notably, the distinction between sex 
and sexual affiliations arose in the sexual-favoritism context before 
Congress amended Title VII to endorse mixed-motive analysis.202 In 
fact, the Supreme Court had previously interpreted the history and 
language of Title VII to be concerned primarily with differential 
treatment based solely on protected characteristics.203 Today, 
however, relying on sex as a motivating factor in an employment 
decision constitutes unlawful discrimination even when other 
legitimate factors also motivate the decision.204 It is arguably unclear 
whether the distinction between sex and sexual affiliations remains a 
defensible basis for rejecting discrimination claims arising in the 
context of romantic relationships without individualized inquiry into 
whether gender actually motivated a particular termination.205 
 
 199. See supra notes 81, 85 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra Part II.B. 
 201. DeCintio v. Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 306–07 (2d Cir. 1986); see also 
supra Part II.B. 
 202. See DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306–08 (drawing this distinction in the context of an 
employment decision intended to favor a paramour (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 
477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986); L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 
(1978))); see also supra notes 33–37, 52–54 and accompanying text. 
 203. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (“The emphasis of both 
the language and the legislative history of the statute is on eliminating discrimination in 
employment; similarly situated employees are not to be treated differently solely because they 
differ with respect to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”). 
 204. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.  
 205. For example, one might argue that distinctions based on sexual affiliation cannot justify 
dismissal of claims arising in the context of employer–employee romantic relationships because 
gender is a motivating factor in romantic relationships and in any termination stemming from 
such relationships. But this argument is susceptible to the same deficits as the argument that 
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In any event, the distinction between sex and sexual affiliations 
provides only a limited basis for extending the romantic-relationship 
rule beyond the context of romantic relationships. Sexually suggestive 
employee conduct does not necessarily indicate that a romantic 
relationship exists. Much like an employee engaged in a romantic 
relationship with her employer,206 however, an employee who 
knowingly engages in sexually suggestive conduct at work injects a 
sexual component into the workplace. Unquestionably, an employer’s 
discouraging sexual conduct in the workplace is not problematic 
under Title VII.207 Most employers generally discourage such conduct, 
and most employees reasonably anticipate that such conduct could 
end their employment. Moreover, courts are accustomed to 
distinguishing between sexual and nonsexual conduct in various legal 
contexts. 
In contrast, extending the romantic-relationship rule to dismiss 
claims arising in the context of personal relationships not involving 
employee sexual conduct208 is far less defensible. The recognized 
distinction between sex and sexual affiliations209 does not justify 
extending the rule in this context because personal relationships are 
not necessarily sexual or romantic. Unlike an employee who engages 
in sexually suggestive conduct at work or has a romantic relationship 
with her employer, an employee who has a platonic friendship with 
 
romantic jealousy is inherently based on gender. See supra Part III.A. An alternate argument 
comes into focus when the sexual-affiliation distinction is relied upon to dismiss claims arising 
from terminations based on sexual orientation. See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36 
(2d Cir. 2000) (“Because the term ‘sex’ in Title VII refers only to membership in a class 
delineated by gender, and not to sexual affiliation, Title VII does not proscribe discrimination 
because of sexual orientation.”). Arguably, the sexual-affiliation distinction does not justify 
dismissal in this context because terminations based on sexual orientation may be impermissibly 
motivated by sex stereotypes. The EEOC and an increasing number of courts have endorsed 
this position. Brief of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Rehearing at 3, Muhammad v. Caterpillar, Inc., 767 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 
12–1723), 2014 WL 5323209, at *1. The validity and scope of the sexual-affiliation distinction are 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
 206. See Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Love at Work, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 237, 246 
& n.74 (2006) (distinguishing between romantic relationships that include a sexual component 
and other workplace relationships, including those that may involve psychological intimacy). 
 207. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998) (establishing an 
affirmative defense from vicarious liability in harassment claims when an “employer exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and . . . the 
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer”). 
 208. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
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her employer does not introduce a sexual component into the 
workplace. 
Importantly, personal relationships are commonplace in the 
workplace,210 and the workplace environment is inherently conducive 
to their formation.211 Indeed, social science suggests that personal 
relationships are bound to form in the workplace—and that such 
relationships overwhelmingly benefit both employers and 
employees.212 Over time, most workplace relationships tend to 
develop qualities similar to those involved in intimate personal 
relationships.213 Distinguishing between ordinary workplace 
relationships and personal relationships is not only unfamiliar 
territory for courts, but also profoundly problematic because the line 
between the two types of relationships is uncertain at best.214 
That employment decisions motivated by feelings are generally 
not prohibited by Title VII215 does not justify extension of the 
romantic-relationship rule to personal relationships. The romantic-
relationship rule essentially operates as a presumption that 
employment decisions stem from personal feelings whenever a 
romantic relationship exists between an employer and an employee.216 
 
 210. See, e.g., Stephen R. Marks, Intimacy in the Public Realm: The Case of Co-workers, 72 
SOC. FORCES 843, 850 (1994) (concluding based on empirical research that half of American 
workers form “close friendships” and discuss “important matters” with coworkers); see also 
Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 
1, 9 (2000) (“For those who work full-time, most discussions of current issues and events, 
movies, sports, popular culture, and personal relationships outside the family are with 
coworkers.”). 
 211. See Estlund, supra note 210, at 12 (noting that the social environment of the workplace 
itself “engenders personal feelings of affection, sympathy, empathy, and friendship among 
coworkers”); Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 206, at 246 n.74 (“The workplace is a stage to form 
other types of personal relationships such as strong friendships or mentorships.”). 
 212. Laura A. Rosenbury, Working Relationships, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 117, 130 
(2011). 
 213. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 210, at 9 (“Through . . . repeated and frequent 
interactions, coworkers often learn about each others’ lives and develop feelings of affection, 
mutual understanding, empathy, and loyalty.”). 
 214. See id. at 12 (“Relationships that form in the workplace often spill beyond it, and make 
up much of our social circles.” (citing ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN 
WORK BECOMES HOME AND HOME BECOMES WORK 35–52 (1997))); Rosenbury, supra note 
212, at 119 (noting that workplace relationships that “are at times primarily transactional” may 
“at other times . . . take on intimate qualities similar to those of family relationships or 
friendships”). 
 215. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 216. See id. Some commentators argue that courts deciding Title VII claims have generally 
“begun to presume that personal animosity most likely motivated the employer.” Chad Derum 
& Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the Return to 
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But applying the same presumption whenever a personal relationship 
exists between an employer and an employee is problematic. 
Significantly, the presence of the triggering condition for the 
presumption—the existence of a personal relationship rather than an 
ordinary workplace relationship—would be difficult to discern 
reliably. More fundamentally, social science suggests that personal 
relationships in the workplace are enormously common.217 
Consequently, a general rule that employment decisions based on 
personal relationships do not constitute sex discrimination runs the 
risk of eviscerating the protections afforded by Title VII. 
Limiting the personal relationships that can trigger dismissal of 
sex-discrimination claims to those that are consensual cannot cure the 
significant problems with extending the romantic-relationship rule to 
the personal-relationship context. As the concurring justices in 
Nelson recognized, “subtle issues of power and control . . . make the 
line between consensual and submissive relationships difficult to 
draw.”218 In some cases, that line might be drawn in the wrong place, 
meaning that an employer’s unreciprocated and unwelcome conduct 
toward an employee could ultimately result in the dismissal of her 
claim. In addition, an employer’s unreciprocated and unwelcome 
conduct could easily be interpreted to support the conclusion that an 
employer–employee relationship was personal and consensual. For 
example, the concurring justices in Nelson reasoned that the sexually 
suggestive comments by Dr. Knight—comments they acknowledged 
“would commonly be viewed as inappropriate” and “beyond the 
reasonable parameters of workplace interaction”—supported the 
conclusion that he and Nelson had a consensual personal 
relationship.219 Yet as the majority opinion acknowledged, the same 
comments could have supported a claim for sexual harassment 
against him.220 Importantly, both forms of sexual harassment 
recognized under Title VII typically involve sexually suggestive 
 
‘No Cause’ Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (2003). Note that the facts of Nelson do 
not suggest that Dr. Knight felt personal animosity toward Nelson. Nelson v. James H. Knight 
DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Iowa 2013). 
 217. See supra notes 210–13 and accompanying text. 
 218. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 80 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially) (citing Billie Wright 
Dziech, Robert W. Dziech II & Donald B. Hordes, ‘Consensual’ or Submissive Relationships: 
The Second-Best Kept Secret, 6 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 83 (1999)). 
 219. Id. at 78, 79–80. 
 220. Id. at 72 n.7 (majority opinion). 
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conduct.221 Of course, suggestive conduct that is competent to support 
a harassment claim is not necessarily pervasive or severe enough, 
standing alone, to prove actionable harassment.222 But any rule that 
allows an employer’s unreciprocated sexually suggestive conduct to 
trigger dismissal of an employee’s sex-discrimination claim on 
summary judgment is flatly inconsistent with the spirit and purpose of 
Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws. 
Critically, from the fact than an employee did not tell her 
employer she was offended by his behavior223 or the fact that she did 
not file a sexual-harassment claim,224 it does not follow that the 
employer’s conduct was welcome. There are many reasons why an 
employee enduring unwelcome sexual conduct at the hands of her 
employer might choose not to complain or decide not to file a sexual-
harassment claim.225 Her employer’s conduct might be offensive, but 
not severe or pervasive enough to prove a sexual-harassment claim.226 
Her wisest course of action might be to quietly seek other 
employment, particularly if she lives in a rural town with a limited job 
 
 221. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65–67 (1986) (describing sexual 
harassment prohibited by Title VII); see also Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 
908 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Title VII now prohibits both quid pro quo harassment, where an 
employee’s submission to or rejection of a supervisor’s unwelcome sexual advances is used as 
the basis for employment decisions, and hostile work environment harassment, where ‘the 
workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive 
working environment.’” (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993))). 
 222. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (concluding that to establish a hostile work environment, the 
conduct must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of . . . employment and 
create an abusive working environment” (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67) (quotation marks 
omitted)).  
 223. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 66 (“Nelson does not remember ever telling Dr. Knight . . . 
that she was offended.”). 
 224. See id. at 65, 72 n.7 (pointing out that Nelson “did not bring a sexual harassment or 
hostile work environment claim”). Although Nelson did not initially file a sexual-harassment 
claim, she did later argue that her petition was broad enough to support a sexual-harassment 
claim. See Second Petition for Rehearing at 4, Nelson, 834 N.W.2d 64 (No. 11–1857). 
 225. See, e.g., Jo Annette Jacobs, Note, No More Nervous Breakdowns: Sexual Harassment 
and the Hostile Work Environment, 62 UMKC L. REV. 521, 523–25 (describing considerations 
employees may weigh in choosing how to respond to sexual harassment); Martha S. West, 
Preventing Sexual Harassment: The Federal Courts’ Wake-Up Call for Women, 68 BROOK. L. 
REV. 457, 467–68 (2002) (describing “well-documented reasons why women often fail to 
complain about workplace harassment”). 
 226. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
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market227 or works in a specialized field with limited employment 
opportunities. Alternatively, because she reasonably believes that she 
lacks any viable employment alternative, she might try to defuse the 
situation through avoidance.228 In short, employees often avoid 
directly confronting employers who engage in unwelcome sexual 
conduct,229 and they often do so for logical and understandable 
reasons. 
As the preceding analysis suggests, even a rule that permits only 
consensual personal relationships between employers and employees 
to trigger the dismissal of sex-discrimination claims sweeps far too 
broadly. Such a rule would operate to protect employers from liability 
for sex discrimination in circumstances arising through no fault of 
employees. Indeed, such a rule could operate to protect an employer 
who engages in sexually suggestive behavior toward an employee 
because he finds her to be sexually desirable. 
CONCLUSION 
Judicial hesitation to recognize romantic-jealousy claims likely 
stems at least in part from apprehension about opening the floodgates 
to such claims.230 But any fear that recognizing romantic-jealousy 
claims will lead to widespread, devastating judgments against 
employers is misplaced. Jealousy is rarely discussed in discrimination 
cases, which suggests that employers rarely cite jealousy as the basis 
 
 227. The 2010 census reported the population of the town where Dr. Knight’s dental office 
is located as 25,206. State & County QuickFacts: Fort Dodge (City), Iowa, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
(July 8, 2014, 6:44 PM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/19/1928515.html. 
 228. See Jacobs, supra note 225, at 524 (observing that the most common response to sexual 
harassment “is to avoid or ignore it in hopes that it will go away” or to “seek to defuse the 
situation by joking, stalling, or negotiating”).  
 229. Id. (“Very few women use direct confrontation, such as telling the harasser to stop or 
pursuing a formal complaint.”).  
 230. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 70 (“Nelson’s viewpoint would allow any termination 
decision related to a consensual relationship to be challenged as a discriminatory action because 
the employee could argue the relationship would not have existed but for her or his gender.”). 
Judicial hesitation to recognize romantic-jealousy claims might also stem in part from the 
tension between antidiscrimination laws and the employment-at-will doctrine or the desire to 
safeguard the institution of marriage. See id. at 75 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially) (“Thus, 
while the loss of a job is often devastating to an employee, and at times unfair, these 
considerations do not play a role under our employment-at-will doctrine, and our exceptions to 
this law, such as sex discrimination, are only based on the underlying discriminatory motivation 
of the decision maker.” (citing Jasper v. H. Nizam, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 751, 762 (Iowa 2009))); id. 
at 67–71 (majority opinion) (emphasizing that Nelson was perceived to be a “threat” to the 
Knights’ marriage). 
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for their employment decisions. It is safe to assume that this trend 
would remain unchanged if employers learned that they could face 
potential liability for jealousy-based employment decisions.231 
Furthermore, employee victories would be primarily symbolic in 
cases in which the liable employer proved that he would have made 
the same decision even if he had not been motivated by gender. 
These symbolic victories would offer psychological, if not financial, 
recompense to victims of discrimination. They would also perform a 
meaningful expressive function by reinforcing the fundamental values 
underlying antidiscrimination laws. 
Whatever the potential costs of acknowledging the viability of 
romantic-jealousy claims, they do not outweigh the potential costs of 
continued refusal to recognize theoretically viable sex-discrimination 
claims. The suggestion that romantic jealousy generally constitutes a 
lawful basis for employment decisions creates a perverse incentive for 
employers to falsely cite jealousy as the motivation for their 
employment decisions. In theory, jealousy could come to operate as a 
de facto defense to sex-discrimination claims—a defense that would 
be alarmingly simple to invoke. Admittedly, courts could develop 
standards to limit the operation of jealousy as a defense to sex-
discrimination claims to circumstances in which jealousy was justified 
or reasonable. But this approach to solving the “de facto defense” 
problem is hardly preferable to avoiding the problem altogether 
through careful application of mixed-motive analysis to romantic-
jealousy claims. 
To be sure, we might be sympathetic to individuals experiencing 
romantic jealousy. Jealousy is unpleasant, and some jealous persons 
are justified in fearing that a relationship is in jeopardy. But jealousy 
can be a destructive force causing harm that extends beyond the 
person experiencing it.232 Moreover, it is not difficult to imagine 
 
 231. Even if this assessment is incorrect, courts should arguably refrain from considering the 
possibility of increased judicial workload when shaping the substantive law. See generally Marin 
K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007 (2013) (arguing in favor of a 
presumption against floodgates arguments). 
 232. Tucker, supra note 143, at 224–27. It is well documented, for example, that romantic 
jealousy often motivates homicide and abuse. See id. at 225–26 (summarizing research 
concerning the connection between romantic jealousy and incidents of homicide and abuse). 
Even if society chooses to accept a conception of romantic jealousy “as both innate and 
inextricable from love,” it must not be deluded into viewing jealousy as benign. Id. at 222, 224–
31 (concluding that “jealousy is far from benign, and as a culture we should therefore be 
interested in minimizing, rather than encouraging, its effects”). 
ROGERS IN PP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015  11:44 AM 
2015] RETHINKING ROMANTIC JEALOUSY 1497 
jealousy arising based on the perception of a threat that is entirely 
imagined. 
Antidiscrimination laws do not protect employees against 
general unfairness,233 but courts must be mindful of the underlying 
purposes of those laws in determining the scope of their protections. 
Sex-discrimination claims that arise because an employer terminated 
an employee due to romantic jealousy call for thorough analysis of 
the underlying circumstances to determine the motivations that gave 
rise to jealousy. To accurately determine whether a jealousy-based 
termination was simply unfair or whether it constituted unlawful 
discrimination, courts must look behind the jealousy. 
 
 
 233. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 69 (“Title VII and the Iowa Civil Rights Act are not general 
fairness laws, and an employer does not violate them by treating an employee unfairly so long as 
the employer does not engage in discrimination based upon the employee’s protected status.”). 
